

JEAN PAUL SARTRE'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AND DEATH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

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Abstract

Without a doubt, the human being is a free being. He is an intelligent being with the ability to make important decisions that can affect not only his own life but also the lives of others. These abilities show that certain parts of human existence may surely be altered by a person's free will. However, there are unavoidable everyday situations in which a person's independence and ability to make decisions are curtailed or even seem to be taken away from him. This article uses the hermeneutic method. Hermeneutics is the theory and methodology of interpretation. Hermeneutics is the theory and methodology of interpretation. This method is deemed appropriate in this situation since it makes elucidating Sartre's views on freedom and death relatively convenient. The primary objective of this paper is to hermeneutically reflect on two significant and intimately connected topics of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism: freedom and death. Conforming to Sartre, man first exists and then independently establishes his nature via deliberate decisions. However, he sees death as a phenomenon that prohibits freedom and happens regardless of human choices. This essay aims to demonstrate any possible link between freedom and death in Sartre's ideas. Sartre's claim that man is completely free yet that same freedom is constrained by death is examined for logic and consistency. The main purpose of the research work is to lessen contradictions in this Sartrean viewpoint by attempting to give a better interpretation of it.

Keywords: Sartre, Freedom, Death, Being, Consciousness

Introduction

It appears that free will and determinism coexist in a useful and unbreakable way. The two seem to be even more comparable to one another than two sides of the same coin. Determinism lurks everywhere there is free will. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is credited as saying that "man is born free but everywhere in chains" (Rousseau, 1968: i), which may have been the result of his awareness of this revered reality. This similar insight is what motivated this researcher to investigate Sartre's idea of freedom in regard to the certainty of death. The researcher is particularly interested in figuring out the enigmatic connection between free will and determinism- a connection that is rather clear despite the ferocious discussion between the polar positions of the proponents of free will and determinism. Before learning Sartre's startling claim that man is completely

free and that his existence comes before his essence, the current researcher's philosophical focus had always been on this. Before choosing his path, he must first exist. Since it completely ignores the influences or function of determinism in human existence, Sartre's position is extreme.

The researcher is driven to discover the factors that lead Sartre to adopt this extreme stance and how that stance molds or influences his conception of death, birth, luck, and other factors in human existence that are fixed or given but not primarily the result of human choice or freedom. Note that determinism, a philosophical position, holds that all occurrences, including moral decisions, are wholly predetermined by previously existent causes (Britanica Emcy, 2017). Because determinism implies that humans are incapable of acting in a manner different from what they do, it is typically seen to prohibit free choice. Because perfect knowledge of any given situation ensures that perfect knowledge of its future is equally achievable, the theory contends that the cosmos is totally rational.

On the other hand, free will refers to a person's ability or power to make decisions or do actions without being constrained by the laws of nature, society, or the will of God (Britanica Emcy, 2017). The bulk of determinists reject the existence of free will. Arguments in favor of free will are founded on feelings of subjective freedom, guilt, revealed religion, and the assumption of universal responsibility for one's own acts, which is the foundation of ideas like law, reward, punishment, and motivation (Britanica Emcy, 2017). Sartre absolutized free will, making man the final arbiter or decider of his course, intent, and objectives.

He asserted that man is inescapably doomed to live by his decisions because of the fundamental or paramount importance of free will. The only factor determining a person's essence or value is his or her decisions. So is Sartre implying that there are options available to humans in every situation? If so, then why does he believe that freedom is impossible after death? Sartre insists that freedom is absolute even if he is aware that factors like death always remove a person's ability to make decisions or exercise choice. These inquiries convey the awe around the free will-determinism dilemma on the one hand, and Sartre's extreme position on the other, which sparked the researcher's motivation and choice of this study issue.

The Phenomenological Foundation of Sartre's Concept of Freedom

Heidegger's attempt for a response to the question: What is being? Truly served as the inspiration for Sartre's investigation of freedom and the resulting

perspective on man. Heidegger emphasizes the necessity for a return to ontology at the opening of his major work, *Being and Time*. He claims that being is at the center of all of our ideas and actions, that it is the most universal notion, that it cannot be defined, that it includes man in its universality, that we are part of it, and that its meaning is constantly obscure. Therefore, the fundamental query in philosophy is what does being mean? (Heidegger, 1962:23).

However, Being has some requirements for such investigation. The investigation cannot be pushed arbitrarily; only a Being who is a being may pose and respond to the query. So, of all the objects to which we assign the label "Being," only one is capable of handling the examination, namely, a being that looks at or investigates itself, as Heidegger notes. Man is one such creature. He is known as Dasein by Heidegger. Therefore, a basic explanation of what it is to be a man is required in order to formulate the meaning of being correctly and clearly (Heidegger, 1962:9). Analyzing dasein is necessary to identify the nature of sein (being).

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In a nutshell, for Heidegger, the study of experiences known as phenomenology and the study of beings known as ontology are not two separate branches of philosophy. The two names really refer to philosophy according to its method in one instance and according to its object in the other. An understanding of man's existence and an examination of it may supply the answers to all philosophical concerns. Philosophy is a universal, phenomenological ontology that starts with this interpretation. Similar to how he begins *Being and Nothingness*; Sartre analyzes phenomena before determining what it means to be. He then continues with an investigation of human life.

Insofar as it enables us to reduce the existing to the succession of appearances that disclose it, realizing that being is a phenomenon is, according to him, the

major advancement of contemporary philosophy. In Sartre (1993:65) According to him, this is how we come to understand the concept of phenomenon as it appears, for instance, in the phenomenology of Husserl or Heidegger. Therefore, what manifests is the existing. Observe that it only displays itself, not revealing anything contained inside it (Sartre 1993:66). Its look is exactly what is disclosed; it does not have anything true inside of it that causes it to manifest. Phenomenology is, in essence, a direct examination of the elements of sensory experience.

Such examination forces one to deal with appearance first. These appearances are offered to one, so to speak. They wouldn't occur unless something else did. But if these appearances are real, then, in Sartre's view, we have found Being just for show is being. 'It is.' The only way to describe its mode of existence is in that sense. All revelation simply depends on being (Sartre, 1993:49). So what does the phenomenon show? Therefore, for there to be appearance, there has to be both that which appears and that to whom it appears; a perception act and a perception act; the perceived and the perceiver; and the object and the subject.

Does the perception make up the perceived when referring the elements of these pairings to one another, making the object's *esse percipi*? Sartre responds, "No," in 1993:49. He points out that every idealism aims to reduce existence to the knowledge that sits at its core, but for an idealism to be well-founded, it must first demonstrate the existence of knowledge, which existence depends upon. The *esse est percipi* hinges entirely on doing something, thus failure to do so negates it. As a result, in any sound philosophy, according to Sartre (Sartre, 1993:32), the foundation of knowing must be based on something that is outside the realm of knowledge.

The relationship between perceiver and perceived must, in his opinion, is a trans-phenomenal reference of object to subject, subject to object, or knowledge would otherwise vanish into oblivion (Sartre, 1993:32). As Husserl so eloquently emphasized, all consciousness is awareness of something and is hence inherently purposeful. On the side of the subject, then, such a trans-phenomenal dimension is produced by consciousness in self. Before it is a representation of a pleasurable thing, for instance, pleasure is an occurrence. The phenomena suggests an intentional subject, the so-called "consciousness self," which is the subject of the most concrete experiences but is more really identical with those experiences than connected to them. In the sense that the subject is a pure self-consciousness identical with an awareness of, as Sartre notes, it has nothing solid about it; it is only an appearance. As for the object, it can be known as what it is without relying on reflexive consciousness,

according to its *percipi*. Since it is required trans-phenomenally as the object of purposeful awareness, it instead depends on pre-reflexive consciousness.

Husserl thought that the intentions of the ego and the being of the object were necessary for the cogito's pre-reflexive existence. The object would therefore be formed by knowing it, but as something transcendently needed by the very existence of consciousness, as Sartre very carefully puts out, since the noema is the simple correlative of the noesis. Sartre's continual insistence that it must always be active and never inert is evidence of its independence from the subject. Simply said, being or a phenomenon must have a subject and an object that are inextricably linked to one another: a being or a phenomenon is a phenomenon because it is conscious of itself in all manifestations. It is a self-awareness or "being-for-itself"; a being or phenomenon that appears to consciousness as a trans-phenomenal object of that consciousness but is not reflexively aware of itself is a "being-in-itself." So there are two types of phenomena: the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi*.

Sartre's Idea of Freedom

In theory, all action is purposeful, according to Sartre. True action requires the performer to be aware that they are performing. No political or economic truth can make an individual act since action must always be purposeful. Thus, as stated by Sartre, "the indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the acting being" (Sartre, 1956:436). Insofar as the *pour-soi* exists as "lack," freedom is therefore demonstrated by it. The *pour-soi*'s emptiness is its absence. The *pour-soi* is nothing because it constantly 'exists' in motion; it is non-static in existence. The *pour-soi* is what it is not, and what it is not, at the same time. The *pour-soi*'s existence is indissolubly linked to freedom, choice, and action. Without choice, there cannot be freedom; without freedom, there cannot be decision; without freedom, there cannot be action. And yet, as Sartre puts it, "To choose ourselves is to nihilate ourselves," which is to bring about a future that reveals who we are by giving our past a purpose.

By making a decision, one is affecting the rise of a specific limited extension of a concrete and continuous duration, which is precisely what keeps people from realizing their initial potential. Thus, freedom, autonomy, annihilation, and temporalization are all synonymous. (Sartre, 1956) In contrast to popular belief, Sartre rejects the idea of freedom as a set of external circumstances that let a person to make decisions. Freedom, according to Sartre, is rather the doomed state of being of the *pour-soi*. "We are a freedom that chooses, but we do not choose to be free," he observes. As we already stated, we are either abandoned or doomed to freedom (Sartre, 1956:485). Freedom is its requirement since the

pour-soi is ambiguous in its very nature. Freedom is not a trait I was born with or a characteristic that I acquired later in life. It perfectly captures the essence of who I am, according to Sartre (1956:439).

Sartre elucidates. One must bear in mind that, for Sartre, human existence is its own emptiness in order to understand his concept of freedom. The pour-soi must decide for itself in order to be. The pour-soi cannot rely on or adhere to any inherent human nature or God-given essence. The pour-soi is "completely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself be—down to the smallest detail" without any assistance of any kind. The freedom of man, or his emptiness of being, is thus not a being (Sartre, 1956:411). If essence is seen ontologically, it is a necessary presumption, and in this instance, it would imply that man must be a man. However, from an existential perspective, a man can be "not man" by acting untruthfully; in other words, he can just blend in over the course of his typical everyday existence. He is not a respectable man, running from personal accountability. Therefore, existentially speaking, man is not required to be a man because being 'human' does not need the requisite will. However, in order for a guy to be a man, he must make a decision. In this sense, freedom defines what it is to be a man (Sartre, 1979:54).

We do not have freedom in the sense that we "possessed" free will, according to Sartre; neither is it a positive characteristic nor a fundamental element of the human person. Furthermore, Sartre does not contend that liberty is a political or social right; we are not "conferred" liberty just because we exist in a given society and are a member of a particular social structure. Freedom is more accurately stated as a loss of essence, a lack of being, or, to put it another way, a nihilation of existence. In fact, "Nihilation," as Sartre puts it, "is precisely the being of freedom." (Sartre, 1956, p. 443). Nihilation is the source of freedom itself since "consciousness is not what it is and is what it is not" (Sartre, 1956:67).

Due to the fact that awareness is not a "thing," it is not what it is. Since consciousness is not constrained to be what it is fundamentally, it is free since it lacks an essence. Contrarily, consciousness is also "what it is not," since it is the source of all negation in the universe. We would just exist as a being-in-itself (en-soi) without consciousness. Denial, questioning, doubt, and destruction can only be brought about by the development of awareness, as Sartre correctly notes (Sartre, 1956:8). To put it another way, because we lack an essence, or pour-soi, we are free because we are not compelled to be any one thing in particular.

We are also free because we may reject the idea that, for example, our social or economic status determines "who we are." We might thus mistrust and query our very existence. But by doubting and challenging our life as it is right now, we are liberated to reinvent ourselves. Speaking more broadly about Sartre's idea of freedom, it can be said that our relationship to what he refers to as the en-soi, or the in-itself, as well as our relationship to ourselves, is one of nihilation: it is a recognition on our part that we are not our genes, not our social or economic class, not our sexual persuasion, etc. We understand that the only things we can ever have are "situations" instead, as a pour-soi, for-itself.

Sartre describes a scenario as a conflict between my awareness and outside "facts." Making decisions in a circumstance is necessary because of this conflict between what we want to be and the external limitations of our surroundings, which restrict us from becoming all that we can be. We give a decision significance and value by selecting one option over another. "There is a situation only through freedom, and there is a situation only in a situation," said Sartre. Everywhere, human reality faces opposition and impediments that it did not create, yet these hurdles and resistances only have significance because human reality is a free decision. (Sartre 1956:489).

The power of the pour-soi to make decisions is what Sartre refers to as transcendence: we transcend our "facticity" (our social or economic class, race, height, weight, etc.) precisely because we have this capacity to do so in each given scenario, and these decisions influence, if only partially, the next situation. As a result, we are constantly in charge of our circumstances as well as the results of our decisions. Since we are ultimately in charge of the decisions we make in a given scenario, "it itself cannot appear without being haunted by value and projected towards its own possibilities." (Sartre, 1956:96). Humans are "condemned to be free," according to Sartre's famous quote, regardless of the situation or context. However, it is this very freedom that enables us to give meaning to our decisions (Sartre, 1956:509).

Sartre's Perspective on Death

According to Sartre, the basic "fact" of death or more specifically, of my death, is only a new conflict in a protracted conflict between I and the other. Sartre believes that death is not at all a structure in and of itself (pour-soi). Death, in actuality, is the last "fact" that "alienates us completely in our lives to the benefit of others." "To be dead is to be prey for the living," Sartre says (Sartre, 1956:543). Death is considered ludicrous in Sartre's existentialism, just as being alive is (de trop). Sartre asserts that "all existent beings are born without cause, endure due to weakness, and pass away through chance.

Man is a pointless obsession. The fact that we are born and the fact that we pass away have no significance (Sartre, 1949:180). The being-for-itself (*pour-soi*), which is consciousness, freedom, transcendence, and endless yearning, is never what it is and is always in a stage of becoming. While consistently going above and beyond its past, present, and future ambitions, it is always projecting itself into new circumstances. It moves easily and quickly. Sartre believes that the ontological basis of freedom or awareness is the fact that the *pour-soi* is always greater than its environment. Death puts a stop to this ongoing transformation of freedom or consciousness into novel possibilities to be what it is not. When someone passes away, they essentially become a thing (*en-soi*). Human potential and projections cease to exist with death. Death makes one complete and static. The *pour-soi*, while we are still alive, "spontaneously" projects itself into new circumstances while keeping in mind the past, present, and future while remaining far more than any one of these past, present, or future projects. As Darter points out, we are always more than our basic facticity would imply.

The projection of freedom, however, that it is something greater than the sum of our material realities, ceases with death. After passing away, the person enters the *en-soi* condition. Thus, we transform into a static, immobile object. Therefore, Sartre observes that death, or more specifically, my death, cannot emerge in a circumstance since death is that which "comes to us from the outside and transforms us into the outside" (Sartre, 1949:454). In *No Exit*, Sartre argues that when we die, our lives just turn into potential objects that the Other might use to interpret and reinterpret them in accordance with their own "instrumental complex."

As a result, death really "is the outside of freedom." Just as the crag was only a subject for us to illumine using our own unique instrumental complex, our lives, our legacies, and the decisions we make become objects for someone *pour-soi* to reinterpret and adapt. If Sartre is correct about everything, then when we pass away, we actually become "prey" for the Other. The way Sartre views freedom raises some quite puzzling issues. First, in what sense are our bodies and, by extension, our legacy still deemed to be ours if they may be freely reinterpreted by others? Do we retain some aspect of our own identity when we pass away, in other words?

Do we not have the ability to choose how we want to be remembered while we are still alive? When we pass away, will "us" still exist in any form? These are significant problems, but it doesn't appear like Sartre addresses them based on his analysis. We think that at least part of our facticity survives death- things

like our body, our history, or even the connections we had with others- are things that are unchangeably ours and are left behind. Additionally, common sense would lead us to conclude that these "facts" about us belong to us and us alone. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre tries to address a number of concerns, although he may argue that they are just less relevant. These arguments don't pertain to the ontological structures of itself per se, according to Sartre. Instead, the aforementioned issues are factual, social, or, depending on our priority, possibly political concerns that only have a parasitic connection to the ontological dimension cannot and must not be turned into potential initiatives for other people.

Sartre Notion of Bad Faith

One of the distinctive ideas in Sartre's philosophy, bad faith is pertinent to ideas like genuine choice, freedom, and responsibility. In a contradictory way, lying to oneself is bad faith. The individual must be split against himself in order for such a deception to be conceivable; he feels some kind of division inside his existence, with one half hiding from the other what it inadvertently knows. Since this action takes place inside the unity of a single mind, a paradoxical division results. The division of humanity is the fundamental foundation of ill faith. Every person is a part of a circumstance.

Situations are a complex mixture of facticity (the given) and transcendence (the exceeding of the given by human freedom of choice). Bad faith occurs when a person tries to escape or avoid the suffering that this ambiguity causes, either by transforming our transcendence into facticity (as in various forms of determinism) or by transforming our facticity into transcendence (like the dreamer who refuses to accept the realities of his real, everyday life). Therefore, acting in bad faith is essentially running away from our freedom in the present. When people give in to social pressure to accept false beliefs and abandon their inherent freedom as sentient beings, they are not acting or living genuinely. This is an existential problem. One of the main effects of Sartre's concept of full freedom is undoubtedly bad faith. It symbolizes the reality that, despite Sartre's laborious demonstration that man is doomed to live in freedom, he occasionally finds himself unable to exercise his freedom in crucial situations due to the weight of the unknowable repercussions of the decisions to be made. Sartre makes reference to various actions that show poor faith.

He gives the example of a young woman who dates a stranger for the first time and the man wants to grasp her hand and establish a more intimate relationship. She doesn't want to become too close at this point in their friendship, but if she doesn't hold his hand, he could feel upset. In this instance,

the lady tries to fool herself by pretending she doesn't comprehend his motivation. This is an illustration of poor faith. One of the most prevalent and general types of ill faith is an individual trying to escape his obligations by admitting that there are no other options than what they are doing. Other instances of bad faith involve people letting other aspects and variables define who they are and adjusting their behavior in accordance with that identification. Sartre alludes to a servant who quickly and promptly accepts commands to represent this type of ill faith. According to Sartre, he is a slave to the expectations of his clients even if he pretends to be their servant. When a servant is unable to see alternative roles and actions, bad faith begins to develop. Even though he is well aware of his strategy, he overlooks all other possibilities after making a decision. With intentional actions, the server attempts to assist the clients right away. He also employs certain words and expressions to win their favor and establish himself as a trustworthy and knowledgeable servant.

In actuality, he is acting dishonestly by doing these things and saying these things in order to take the position of a servant and, while in this role, to believe that this is who he is. According to Mayes, having bad faith entails not making an effort to find the things that matter most in life or, worse yet, understanding what matters most but choosing to ignore it (Mayes, 2010:32). For Sartre's existentialism, a person who lives honestly is honest with himself. However, when a person conforms to the life styles and perceptions of others rather than their own ethical sense of living, they begin to live for others rather than for themselves. He is, in other terms, for others.

One of the things that lead people to deceive themselves and act dishonestly is suffering. When faced with significant duty and mortality, the person is tormented. According to Sartre, some people may attempt to conceal their misery, even though everyone experiences pain as a result of their heavy duties. He asserts: Existentialism loves to claim that man is suffering. That is what they mean when they say that a man who commits himself and who understands that he is not only the person he chooses to be but also the lawmaker he chooses and, at the same time, what humanity as a whole should be, cannot help but be conscious of his own complete and profound responsibility.

In this kind of deception, the deceiver evidently knows the truth, and he is victimized by his own deception. Self-deception in all its forms carries the same message: "I am not what I am" and "I escape from myself" (Kaufmann, 1956:21). It's true that most individuals don't seem to be really distressed, but we believe that this is just them attempting to avoid or hide their distress. Sartre

(2007:13). As a result, our lack of freedom results in poor faith and causes suffering. According to existentialism, people experience internal suffering on a regular basis, which may be neglected if one ignores the human condition and shuts their eyes to their purpose in life. Bad faith results from avoiding the suffering brought on by freedom and responsibility. Bad faith implies dishonesty of oneself.

An Examination of Jean-Paul Sartre's Conception of Freedom and Death

In order to highlight choice and probability, Jean Paul Sartre developed a framework that emphasizes both the human being's inherent freedom and the role that each individual plays in influencing both freedom and choice. Given the position of man and the condition of man as understood by Sartre, he has produced a theory that concentrates on and enables the existence of man. As a result, the work has some worth. Contrarily, the underlying motivation for this existentialism appears to be based on the fundamentally religious experience of a man having originated from nothing and moving towards nothing, and as such, it has humanistic implications. The contradictions are then a problem. In such case, man has an illogical origin if he emerges from nothing and without purpose.

He pursues self-annihilation by leading a life about which he knows nothing except history. As a result, Sartre's theory is appropriately referred to as an atheistic theology since, although being in direct opposition to a theistic worldview, it nonetheless bases its arguments on God- or, at the very least, the nonexistence of God. According to Sartre, the desire to be and the endeavor to become God are the very source of inspiration and motivation for all of man's deeds. Sartre even suggests that it is impossible to understand the philosophy of existence without first destroying God. He says: "I represent atheistic existentialism, which is more coherent." It asserts that, even in the absence of God, there is at least one being- man, or, as Heidegger puts it, "human reality"- in whose existence precedes essence, a being that exists before he can be described by any notion. When it is said that existence comes before essence, what does it mean? It implies that man must first exist, show up, and enter the scene before defining himself. Man, as the existentialist views him, cannot be defined since he is nothing at start.

He will not actually be anything till after he has created what it is he will be. As a result, there is no human nature since there is no God to conceive of it. Man is not only what he imagines himself to be, but also only what he wills himself to be following this surge into life. (Sartre 1956:19) Sartre's primary objective is to force man to face head-on the consequences for human activity in a cosmos

without purpose since the fundamental foundation of our conduct is predicated on an assumed impossibility, namely the presence of God and the moving of man toward God. Based on the presumption that God doesn't exist and that there isn't a fixed human nature.

Without any outside help, Sartre structured man. The character, judgments, and decisions of man are consequently entirely his own. The reasoning of Sartre is as stated. But Sartre runs from God like a gazelle. For Sartre, the existence of God is an illusion brought about by certain fundamental elements of the entire human predicament. Sartre contends that believing in God is really harmful to human wellbeing and is brought on by a type of "bad faith" or inability to accept the reality of individual freedom. The first sign of bad faith, according to Sartre (1956:15), is when something is fled from that it cannot escape.

Bad faith is a reaction to a situation where man must overcome his sense of self in a world that was created by others but that he must accept as his own due to the requirement of his dependency. He needs to speak up about the world as he sees it. Anguish and loneliness go hand in hand with realizing one is free, and both realizations are followed with sickness. Sartre acknowledges that by claiming to be an atheist, he is stepping outside the domain of experience's certainty and into the region of the speculative and likely. He considers the presence or nonexistence of God to be a philosophical question and metaphysics as an imaginative endeavor unable to produce assurance. In contrast to metaphysics, his ontology is a description of facts, making it, in his opinion, susceptible to the standards of truth or untruth. He appears to have a fundamental aversion to make more assumptions than are supported by the unambiguous evidence of experience. Because death is outside of human existential possibilities, this thesis completely contradicts Sartre's assertion that it is the sole thing that restricts a person's freedom. This is because a fundamental aspect of human existence is death. Death is a given, much like birth and a few other human facts that make up the 'given' (facticity) in human life – things that a person cannot change with their free will.

If Sartre views it as a restriction on freedom, he should be ready to add further restrictions such as birth, a person's surroundings, family, etc. Speaking eloquently about the flaws in Sartre's reasoning is the fact that he acknowledges the presence of these other realities as ones placed on man after death while denying the existence of any other limitations on freedom. It may be claimed that Sartre only does this because he is willing to utilize all of his resources to support the absolutism of freedom. He seems to be concerned that his existentialism – which holds that freedom is total and is devoid of God- would

be undermined if, in addition to death, he included birth, the environment, DNA, etc. as agents of facticity that threaten freedom. As a result, it is impossible to discuss birth and death without mentioning humans. The only other conscious entity is man, who is aware of both his own consciousness and other consciousness's. As a result, basically, only man among other species is fully aware of the ramifications of what it means to die or give birth. So, death might be said to constitute a precise definition of human reality. Furthermore, since death is a characteristic of man's existence in the world, freedom, which Sartre views as the absolute disposition of humanity, should not be prevented by death.

Conclusion

Despite the extreme character of Sartre's postulation on freedom, his viewpoint serves as a reminder that in spite of the difficulties facing our existence in this world, each individual human nevertheless has the power to positively affect his or her own life as well as the lives of others. No one is born without the potential for future development, no matter how unlucky. If we are physiologically able to grow and develop, it follows that we also possess the intrinsic ability to direct our destiny and objectives toward a wonderful conclusion, of course while relying on heavenly support. Sartre's thoughts on freedom and death also bring to mind the never-ending, age-old argument between free will and determinism. Sartre's inability to fully describe how freedom and death relate to one another illustrates how man is a blend of the forces of freedom and determinism. It is possible to claim that a person's level of freedom determines who they are as a whole. It is possible for us to use our free will, but it is not a certainty. Man cannot resolve every issue on his own for this reason.

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