TOLERANCE AS A NORMATIVE PRINCIPLE OF ETHICAL LIFE: A PERSPECTIVE OF ANDREW FIALA'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This study enveloped the behavioural aspect of the individual in respect to his/her interaction with the other beings in the society. The study underscored tolerance as a normative principle on which it reflects on Andrew Fiala's notion of tolerance and ethical life. The main theme of this research is that the level at which tolerance operates as a normative principle is at the ordinary, familiar sense in which restrictions on behavior are mainly cultivated acts of the individuals and applied to the institutions or community of the individuals. Against this backdrop, the work was guided by four objectives designed to consider what it is about tolerance that it seems to be an attractive value or ideal in its own right to many people in a civilized society; to find out what exactly is good about tolerance; to ascertain why as a principle, people ought to be tolerant; and to disclose the silent distinction between the justification of tolerance and the good of toleration. To achieve this, the researcher employed analytical and prescriptive method to study tolerance as a normative principle in relation to Andrew Fiala's notion of tolerance and ethical life. Thus, from the look of the events of life, the sorry history of the human race suggests that we humans are not all that good at the level of relating to our follow beings let alone at the preservation of nature or even of the survival of our species. Perhaps this work imprint, among others that we have got to buy into tolerance and the form of life it defines so as to keep the stream running. This lies in the fact that no man exists in

isolation. Provided we live in the midst of others, we must in one way or the other be moved to tolerate their actions or behavior, given that man is limited in knowledge.

Keywords: Ethical; Moral; Normative; Perspective; Philosophy; Principle

Introduction

The term "Tolerance" has an ethical undertone in which it is a principle guided by reason and hoisted within the mindset of an individual on a resolution that is mutually acceptable by him/her over a given situation. This concept looks simple in its surface description, but deep down, its appropriation is something difficult among individuals. Before resorting to tolerate, a dispute must have erupted a lot of issues between two or more persons. This idea instilled in human consciousness the impression of the fact that toleration is an especially perplexing or elusive virtue.

From the foregoing, the concept "tolerance" has diverse ways from which it is said to be understood and practiced by people or individuals. This entails that tolerance can be approached in different ways from different understanding among different people. Again, it is always pluralistic and has always taken to involve interpersonal, group, intergroup, inter-community and international relations. This idea engendered by the existence or non-existence of this pluralistic tone in the relations between people, groups, and societies, even to the person or group in question, makes the issue of tolerance to be virtue of all virtues. This means that tolerance is always ordained towards disclosure in inter subjective encounter. Thus, this goes to simplify the fact that tolerance occurs and manifests itself in different forms. It can be ethnic, religious, national, cultural, etc., but at its basic consideration, lays the main task of accepting the differences as natural and necessary for individuals, groups, societies etc.

This is the point at which tolerance becomes a normative principle, people practice being responsible through giving away troubles that could hinder personal and group relationship, knowing full well that man is a being with others and that there are a lot of social and individual differences among human beings. Through and in tolerance, these differences are assessed as peculiar qualities that enrich human appearance and knowledge.

Therefore, from the opening pages of Fiala's postulations on tolerance, it appears that he considered the values inherent in the concept of tolerance and differentiated it from some other concepts that are somewhat relational in terms of theory and practice, namely; indifference, relativity, intolerance, dogmatism, fanaticism, and apathy. On the same pedestal, Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* treats tolerance as "consistency" or "consent"[1].

Thus, for toleration to be considered holistically as a moral virtue, it has got to grow beyond ordinary benevolence and friendship. It has to pervade the possible shortage or excess of quality. This is possible when tolerance is perceived as consistency. The coherence in itself implies the same way of assessing common interests. Thus, tolerance as the main argument for agreement in interpersonal relationships both in conceptual and socio-cultural aspects has a lasting presence in the historical space.

But be that as it may, this tolerant coherence has its limits, boundaries beyond which an individual ceases to be a person. If he is swallowed up by the whole (that is, if he fails to preserve his individuality) by becoming the background of the others, melting into them; as well as when the peace of mind is compromised by questioning the possibility of a pluralistic difference in personality. Drawing inspiration from this, Fiala's major aim was to reinstate the value of tolerance to ethical life, at least, by exposing to us the supposedly ways in which issues are to be handled without intensified prejudices. To understand the way Fiala deals with the topic of tolerance in his book entitled, *Tolerance and the Ethical Life* (2005), we must reconstruct three aspects of his theoretical and practical philosophy, namely "activities we approve, activities we do not approve but tolerate, and activities we disapprove and thus find intolerable".[2]

However, Fiala deeply epitomized tolerance and epistemologically analyzed the concept to have its lasting survival in the midst of community of/or individuals who are conscious of their actions. Furthermore, Fiala presents an argument that imprints that tolerance is indeed more normative than a mere relative act.in line with Fiala, Scanlon sees tolerance as , "a recognition of others" as being entitled to live as they choose and "to contribute to the definition of our society."[3] The intolerant alternative, Scanlon believed, is to regard the standing of others as members of one's society as conditional on their sharing one's values, and this involves "a form of alienation from one's fellow citizens."[4] Pointing the good about tolerance, Andrew Fiala maintained that, "some activities will be self-negating, some beliefs will be nonsensical and some types of life will be absurd based upon the standards established by physical, biological or social facts."[5] Of course, this remains the gap which Fiala covered, which has not been considered by other authors

This aspect of Fiala's perception will lead us to developing a different (though not incompatible) characterization of the type of relationship among citizens that a tolerant society encourages, with the aim of calling attention to another way in which toleration is a good. A regime of toleration is a response to normative diversity, and so to the important role played in human life by values, ideals, and principles.For backhanded evidence of the importance of that role we have only to reflect on the extent, ferocity, and persistence of the conflicts that have arisen throughout human history among those who have professed allegiance to differing values or ideals. As Rawls observes, "[t]he most

intractable struggles . . . are confessedly for the sake of the highest things: for religion, for philosophical views of the world, and for different moral conceptions of the good."[6] One might expect that the most profound and intense conflicts would arise not from normative disagreement but simply from brute struggles for power or for the control of scarce resources. Yet even when people do engage in battles for power or resources, there is a strong tendency for them to present and to experience those battles as involving clashes of values or principles and, as Rawls observes, such clashes can be the most difficult of all to resolve.

The Normativity of Tolerance

Tolerance has a deep meaning when attention is turned to the progress of a society. Every society has its peculiar norms in which its people try to cultivate for the peace and progress of the society. In this parlance, tolerance as a principle encompasses a mere wishes of the individuals of a society. This was the brain behind Fiala Andrew's postulation that, "Tolerance is a virtue of what we might call tragic communities."[7] This defined our focus which sees tolerance in its culturally identical context as a factor in human relations in historical development. Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* treats tolerance as "consistency" or "consent".[8] Thus, in a *tragic community*, it is expected that people look well and be consistent in evaluating the given norms in order to avoid misinterpretation of the way of life of other people. This is why it is said that tolerance is best observed within a context of people's culture which is peculiar to them. However, based on our aim which is to consider what it is about toleration that makes it seem too important that many people tend to value it for its own sake.

To make this more precise, let us begin by locating our inquiry in relation to the various distinctions. Possibly, in some circumstances, some would consider instances of toleration in a broad sense. Hence, we think there is much to be learned from studying the wide range of practices that have made peaceful coexistence among contending groups possible in different times and places. But we sense that liberal toleration comprises a distinctive set of arrangements that extend beyond mere *de facto* coexistence, and we want to consider why such arrangements have seemed to many people to be valuable in their own right.

It is possible that the good of toleration, so assumed, has also been made available by other practices and arrangements in other times and places, though whether that is so and what it might show are not questions that we will explore. However, there are things in which a culture may accept or tolerate, which if presented to another culture or people may out-rightly appear to be absurd. The implication is that if one sees other peoples

culture from the spectacle of his/her own culture, there is every tendency that something may be added or removed. In this case, one ought to get himself acquainted with a culture before one can either tolerate or criticize it.

In this instance, tolerance is considered a critical and adequate response to the challenges of how conflicting ways of life can freely express themselves and peacefully coexist with each other. A society that is culturally, religiously, and ideologically plural implies diversity of substantive worldviews and lifestyles. This diversity gives rise to moral controversies over contrasting and conflicting perspectives about the way and manner people, or even society, ought to behave. The need to manage these controversies makes tolerance both relevant and urgent: "Tolerance makes difference possible, difference makes tolerance necessary"[9]. Thus, tolerance of dissenting beliefs and ways of living is seen as a necessary condition for societal functioning, whereas intolerance, its opposite, breeds separation, and tensions and hostilities between individuals and groups.

In the manner of Fiala, tolerance has two perspectives in which it can be viewed and also practiced by a people. In the first instance, tolerance has been seen "as a political principle," in which case, it has been embraced in a more fashionable measure by the Western modern societies and ideological practitioners and, secondly, tolerance can be seen "as a virtue of the ethical life for individuals,"[10] In which case, Fiala postulates that the latter appears to be an ancient idea. In this reflection on tolerance, our focus lies heavily on the practicability of tolerance as an ethical life for individuals in the society, focusing much on the indicators of tolerance in the society. Therefore, tolerance has an in-depth meaning towards the progress and awareness of the potentials of the society by the individuals.

The sustainability of the ethical life of the individuals is heavily determined by the practical aspect of the will of the individuals to concur to the norms of the society. The individuals must develop such good dispositions that would lead him/her to the "modern philosophical and religious emphasis on inward sinciality".[11] This is pure and simple the right route to practicing tolerance because, every society operates with rules and regulations which are mainly different from the individuals' own way of behavior. Thus, it is expedient that the individual should imbibe the rules and regulations inherent in the society no matter his/her inclination to do the otherwise.

The Concept of Tolerance in the Web of Education

In the light of human existence, the truth remains that it is impossible to investigate the phenomenon of human existence or ask questions about the best way for mankind to live without giving some considerations to topics concerned with the intellectual and moral

development of individuals. Indeed, tolerance is a form of moral disposition that has its root vested on the intellectual capacity of the human person. Dewey subscribed to this view when he avers that:

> If we are willing to conceive education as a process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education[12]

The implication of this lies in the fact that intellectual and emotional dispositions embarked upon are emphatically activity done in the domain of philosophical educational. Hence, tolerance in the manners of F. Andrew calls for a genuine recognition of one's failures of imagination. Stressing further, he conceptualized tolerance as "The result of philosophical education."[13] If this idea stands, therefore, we can only be able to tolerate when we are philosophically impacted. The educated individual does not only possess the qualities for toleration, such is indeed capable of objectifying himself in the life of others. He sees others to be more like himself and as a result of that, such a person may not find it a joy doing something that will affect the other person. At this juncture, self-constraint could be well managed in a way that both parties may not be affected. F. Andrew epitomized this idea when he opined that:

> One of the precursors of genuine dialogue is that form of tolerant self-restraint that occurs out of recognition of our own limited capacity to imagine the experience of the other. We only learn to listen to the other after we have learned to deliberately restrain our judging faculties in light of a developed sense of the limits of imagination.[14]

Hence, an educated individual sees a given situation with a different spectacle, such possess the capacity to evaluate and then, come to a conclusion that will not harm the other party. P. H. Harts and R. S. Peters, arguing in this line of thought, offered the admirably succinct conception of philosophy as an activity "concerned with questions about the analysis of concepts and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions and activities."[15] Hence, the basic thing to deduce from this is the fact that tolerance as a normative concept marries itself with the inborn capacity of the individual to examine every issue with the utmost carefulness that would warrant applying knowledge for the sake of ex-raying whatever situation that might pup-up. Doing this is tantamount to philosophizing too, which is the best way to arouse the spirit of tolerance.

This is why Fiala advised that,

> Education towards tolerance must begin from our innate trust in our own imaginative capacity. Normal children possess rich imaginative faculties and the capacity for analogical thinking. Good education takes advantage of this capacity

by expanding the experience of self and world in multiple directions by the study of literature, history, art, etc.[16]

On the same pedestal, the knowledge acquired from these highly ordered educational fields of study enables individuals to imbibe the idea of self-restraint, otherwise one's own opinions and conclusions would stand to be final when attention is geared towards criticism against him/her. Thus, depending on the level of understanding and the manner of approach, one can be enabled to see the vulnerable individual the way he/she is without any form of humiliation. This is because being able to imagine oneself in someone else's situation requires that we know what the other person's life is like. In order words, tolerance is a term that depicts respect for different views and beliefs, behaviors and practices. Tolerant person usually exudes confidence, he/she is tolerant to other points of view, takes a proactive stance. S. Weldon disclosed that "Tolerance … is a fundamental principle of the liberal democratic creed; it requires citizens to uphold and secure the rights of groups, even those they find objectionable, to participate fully in political, social, and economic life"[17.]

In the educational parlance, engaging students in the learning process contributes to the development of the personality of each participant in the process. The importance of this attitude lies in the fact that it helps in raising the level of general and professional culture, the disclosure of internal potential students, and, as a consequence, the formation of personal, ethnic and personal tolerance.[18] By education we mean both training and education, securing the latter a leading role in the formation of a proper level of tolerance.

Interestingly, this measures either public attitudes or the self-assessment of the levels of toleration or acceptance in a community by the people who live in it. At the same time there is a wide set of social indicators covering related fields such as the quality of citizenship policies and practices, and intergroup cohesion. Our set of Tolerance Indicators comes to fill a gap within this rich literature of social indicators, looking at two specific areas of public life that we believe are of paramount importance for shaping social quality in a society. These two fields are education and school life: the Tolerance in School Life Indicators; and politics/public life: the Tolerance in Politics Indicators. Our Indicators measure qualitative aspects of societies' response to the life and attitude of the individual.

They aim to evaluate the tolerance/intolerance situation in society at a given point in time. Our assessment is focused, qualitative and contextually informed and includes not only policy and legislative frameworks but also to the extent possible social practices which may go beyond policy arrangements and legal rules. Such practices indirectly reflect public attitudes although they are not totally conditioned by the latter. The indicators are

qualitative in nature. The basic thing about these indicators is that they capture different aspects of the toleration or acceptance of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in school life and in political life, and are expressed in the form of scores - Low/Medium/High – in a particular issue/field and sub-field.[19]

Pluralism and Critical Tolerance

The idea of pluralism and critical tolerance hinges on the perception that there are many ways in which tolerance could be viewed, understood and practiced by the individuals of the society. Thus, behavioural standards and moral principles are differently applied and accepted by different societies. This goes to simplify the fact that behavioural or social conventions have objective undertone in which a people or culture has to recognize their own fallibility in terms of judging others. This brings the idea of pluralism and critical tolerance to focus. For Fiala, this understanding and performance would "lead us to tolerantly refrain from uncritically negating many of the activities and beliefs which initially appear to us as repugnant."[20]

However, there could be a situation whereby some activities may worth negating, some beliefs may be said to be nonsensical and some life styles may be totally jettisoned or said to be absourd.[21] This simple facts are built around the behavioural standards made feasible by a people maybe through physical, biological or social factors which they accepted within their circle.

Therefore, the simple way to overcome this scenario was provided by Fiala. In his opinion, judgments are basically dictated within the context of meaning. If this hold, Fiala was of the view that, "We must endeavour to discover what these contexts are, if we are to criticize one another."[22] According to Wittgenstein, *"rules" are imbedded in ordinary language*[23] and we have to discover them and apply it appropriately. Where ordinary language fails to resolve a moral question, it merely shows that its rules are incomplete. For Fiala, this implies that we should pay a good attention to people we think that their opinion is not in line with ours, that is, before we take any action, given that our negative thought must propel us to render judgment.[24]

This will cut across the in-depth exposition of the basic moral concepts s adduced by Andrew Fiala in his *Tolerance and Critical Life*

Tolerance vs Action

Tolerance as the chief of all moral principles is a disposition built on the willingness of people to acknowledge the fact of their fallibility and finitude. The basic vehicle to be

fueled in the practice of tolerance is, indeed, concrete experience of a given action put forward by an individual or a group of persons. Thus, in the manner of Fiala, it would be uncritical to vehemently conclude that suicide is bad, given that a kind of suicide may be enveloped with reasons and actions that are beyond our imagination. This way, we need not to give up to the idea that such action is totally bad because our knowledge as mortal beings is limited.[25]

Nevertheless, tolerance in this parlance needs open mind because one may be acting in a way that he thinks right because of his/her tradition, but fails to understand or put other traditions into consideration. Other cultures might accept one form of action which is totally rejected by another culture. Therefore, in other for one to avoid ethnocentrism, such individual must resort to develop his experience beyond his circle. Buttressing this point, Fiala maintains that:

> A tolerant approach must self-critically recognize the continuing possibility of ethnocentrism, while refusing to shy away from condemning an action, belief or culture that, on the face of it, is wrong. After all, occasionally we must judge and act to prevent evil. But tolerance asks us to recognize our own fallibility and need for education, dialogue and self-criticism.[26]

Fiala neatly considered all that might speed up the rate of tolerance among men. In this case, it is paramount to observe that an educated mind always view issues with a different spectacle because, such individual always accommodate other minds and elicit their opinion on the issue no matter the class the other persons might belong to. Thus, Fiala considered this possible, sensing that one can easily subject an activity to third category in a tolerance spirit that is corrugated with education and revision. Hence, he opted for continued dialogue in deciding which action, idea or opinion is the best in tolerance. Consequently, he avers that,

> Continued dialogue is important because I must admit that if my imagination fails me, I cannot be sure I have fully understood what I am condemning. I find that I need more education to help me develop my imaginative capacities so that I might begin to form a basis of interpersonal experience such that I might be willing to tolerate it.[27]

Fiala sees all opinion we hold against other people's action to be full of imagination which can be false, given our limitation in knowledge of some certain things. So, to be on a safer side, we ought to magnify our experience for the sake of understanding others. This way, we can tolerate whatever be the case. Thus, to avoid uncritical generalization, the take of Fiala on this was that we need concrete particulars, which is high level of education. Meanwhile, Fiala was of the opinion that if we truly tolerate others based on the fact that we do not have a concrete idea of the experience of the other, we would have established

that our imaginative ability often fails us. Then, the implication remains that we must not admit that our ability to subject others into judgment is quite limited also.

Diversity and Tolerance

Diversity hinges on the fact of differences among people or cultures. This has been considered as the brain behind today's complex issues arising from men and women in the society, The fact of diversity as it appears to exist among us today in our various societies implies that we can only accept it by being tolerant, otherwise, chaos would be the order of the day. Diversity flows from the idea of pluralism and Fiala accordingly opines that,

> We have no other choice in our day than to pursue a cosmopolitan legal order based on political federalism and ethno-religious multiculturalism in the sense of respecting and even supporting a variety of value traditions.[28]

Reflecting on the above , Apel claims that we have no other choice epitomized by our claim that in our conception of diversity, we are being confronted with the choice of being tolerant, given that in the face of practical goal of peaceful interactions coupled with the notion of diversity, tolerance is required. However, for B. Williams in F. Andrew, tolerance is needed not for its own sake, but for the sake of balancing the already created harm made feasible by the fact of intolerance. This was evident when Williams declared that he hope we have for tolerance lies in the growth of "International commercial society' together with a practical recognition of the 'manifest harms generated by intolerance'[29]

Historically, pluralism and toleration are intertwined and have been highly considered in American perspective of pragmatism, an orientation that demands for the cash value of a given theory. Here, the idea centers on the need to subsume our differences and diversity for the sake of arriving at absolute judgments about the good of human life. Tolerance is needed in the face of diversity so as to eliminate claims that are unhealthy and cannot help to establish a community free of bias and prejudices in terms of self-conscious modesty about our ability to judge others. Most times, we often think that we have a better opinion or idea about the world than the other fellow individual or culture. These we do without considering that we may not have properly understood the point of view that we might resort to censor. In this regard, James, felt that we will not seize from encountering diversity because it is often been influence by ways of life.[30]

The pragmatic point is that what is needed is not certainty about the metaphysics of human being but a practical recognition of the fact of diversity and of the basic human need for free and peaceful coexistence.[31] The contributory factor to our need of tolerance is our inability or failure to create more robust or organic communities.

Understanding diversity is quite interesting because it is a weapon that could wage instability and silence chaos in the society. These ideas have been understood by the Western scholars and have been willing to beat the ugly and accept these costs for the sake of building and showing respect to individuality.[32]

On Apathy and Relativism

In the quest to practice tolerance, the center point therefore, is to live a good life. But this could be possibly achieved under pluralistic attachments of our imaginations. The pluralists believed that many (but not all) different versions of the good possess some claim on our moral imaginations. For Fiala, this idea indicates a task for moral reflection and dialogue in which case, the precondition of it is tolerance.[33]

This goes to mean that we have been faced with the responsibility of tolerating differences and in doing this, we must have critically studied ourselves, side-by-side with others because we can be enabled to arrive at the truth and good life we might wish to achieve in our society. By interaction, we tend to operate at the level of providing an enabling atmosphere for providing plural possibility for good. This way, it is simple to establish that pluralism is not relativism in the sense that the former tend to disclose that many ways abound in which an individual or group might seek to produce good or acquire it. For the pluralists, each of these way by which good can be acquired are in themselves good. By contrast, a relativist would argue that value is intrinsically relative to a world-view or conceptual scheme and that there is a problem of translation between conceptual schemes.[34]

This idea could result to power struggle because there would be no rational mediation against opposed world-views and ways of resolving differences. Hence, the distention between relativism and pluralism demands a huge concern. From the postmodern conception, noting is totalizing, everything is understood in terms of relativism. That is why; the relativists believe that there can be no unifying idea of the good.[35] Beyond this, Fiala underscores a kind of pluralism that permeates the world of good as an ideal principle which only the conscious mind can strive to make sense out of his/her experiences of various 'good' objects within him/her. This Fiala's idea issued from Socratic view that we should endeavour to note that we have no total idea of good even though we tend to make sense of all sort of good. In other words, human beings possess some sort of values. These values need to be protected by our effort to register in the school of thought of understanding. This could be a one way approach to tolerate, given our differences and limit in terms of knowledge. This way, we would have undermined relativism which does not have or expose us to possible resources with which we can get over despotism and fanaticism.[36]

Fiala argues that, "Although we are fallible, we do know some things quite well".[54] His opinion lies on the fact that we do not have the knowledge of all there is. So, there is limit to what we can claim to know. Not minding this factor confronting our knowledge of things, his idea is that we must act and decide to our possible best despite uncertainty.

Tolerance as a Medium to Critical Moral Life

In discussing this, a lot of issues come to the mind: what are the things that could fuel our readiness to tolerate? Why should an individual tolerate? What exactly is good about tolerance and why as a principle, people ought to be tolerant. Each of these intangible aspects of moral dispositions, as supposed, might justify the criticality of tolerance in the universe of morality. AndrewFiala holds these views tenaciously through his distinguished effort to unveil the necessity of tolerance in a pluralistic society. Doing this, Fiala also points out things that could propel imbibing tolerance in a pluralistic way as against relativism.

The fact of our knowledge is limited remains one of the factors that we must consider in building the consciousness that could accommodate tolerating others. However, Fiala maintained that we have got to hunger for philosophical education, since it is the only ladder that could take us to this tolerant vantage point.[37] in view of this, critical moral life is the life that observes and keeps to the tenets of tolerance by way of involving others in consideration when issues arises. To tolerate therefore, connotes being able to let go of some certain mistakes of the other beings not because you are dogmatic or lack understanding of the loopholes inherent in such action, but because you consider the fact of your own fallibility and finitude.

The object of toleration in the personal and political spheres is the critical disposition of one's moral life made feasible by a disliked or disapproved of person which easily can be swallowed by act of tolerance. Persons to be tolerated can differ from us in terms of their values, practices, beliefs, ends, forms of community and association, dispositions, tastes, or preferences[38]. By placing the personal and political concepts of toleration on spectrums of possible responses to disliked and disapproved of people we can clarify what toleration demands. Hence, tolerance marks a substantial shift of principle or attitude; each stage subsequent to tolerance ought to be thought of as going beyond the former stage. Each stage represents a more positive set of responses to disliked and disapproved of differences than the preceding stage.

Evaluation

We have underscored a task of presenting tolerance in its second order of understanding the term which is based according to Andrew Fiala, in cultural perspectiv[39]. Therefore, notion of tolerance is a task for the conscious mind ant it is widely embraced across many settings and also generally considered critical for the peaceful functioning of culturally diverse societies. However, the concepts of tolerance have various meanings and can be applied in different ways and for different purposes, given different understandings. The various understandings raise different empirical questions and might have different implications for the subject positions of those who are tolerant and those who are tolerated. In this study, our task centered deeply on cultural understandings of tolerance and this term is used in discourses. The study follows Andrew Fiala's postulations on which it argues that tolerance has a point of practical departure which lies in the capacity of the individual or group to recognize or understand the fact of his/her infallibility and finitude. It is believed that once this is taken into consideration, one would be able to tolerate the other.

Tolerance is considered a critical and adequate response to the challenge of how conflicting ways of life can freely express themselves and peacefully coexist with each other. A society that is culturally, religiously, and ideologically plural is bound to develop diversity of substantive worldviews and lifestyles which can be resolved only by appealing to tolerance. This goes to mean that diversity gives rise to moral controversies over contrasting and conflicting perspectives about how people, group, or even society, ought to behave within and outside their boundary. The need to manage these controversies and differences or diversity makes tolerance both relevant and urgent. Walzer's claim simplified this point above. For him, "Tolerance makes difference possible, difference makes tolerance necessary"[40]. Tolerance within a cultural beliefs and ways of living is seen as a necessary condition for societal functioning, while intolerance, its opposite could result to separation, and tensions and hostilities between individuals and groups. Many organizations such as the European Union the United Nations (UN), nongovernmental organizations and even political leaders have all warned against intolerance; hence the importance of tolerance in a societies; and proposed policies that promote tolerance. For example, in 1996, the UN General Assembly invited member states to observe November 16th as the International Day for Tolerance, following from the UN Year for Tolerance in 1995. In Europe, there is the "European medal of tolerance," the "European day of tolerance," and a "European model law for the promotion of tolerance and the suppression of intolerance." Furthermore, a European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has been installed.[60]

Conclusion

The main theme of this research is that the level at which tolerance operates as a normative principle is at the ordinary, familiar sense in which restrictions on behavior are mainly cultivated acts of the individuals and applied to the institutions or community of the individuals. The individual give himself to accepting other lifestyles or actions that he/she may not be able to condone, say ordinarily. Thus, tolerance seem to be an attractive value or ideal in its own right to many people in a civilized society and that is why people ought to imbibe it for the sake of peaceful coexistence among us, given our differences and limitations in knowledge and understanding. However, from the look of the events of life, the sorry history of the human race suggests that we humans are not all that good at the level of relating to our follow beings let alone at the preservation of nature or even of the survival of our species. Perhaps this work imprint, among others that we have got to buy into tolerance and the form of life it defines so as to keep the stream running. This lies in the fact that no man exists in isolation. Provided we live in the midst of others, we must in one way or the other be moved to tolerate their actions or behavior, given that man is limited in knowledge.

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