

THE RESURGENCE OF BIAFRAN AGITATION: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 1970-2021

Dan O. Chukwu

Department of History and International Studies,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka

&

Brendan O. Aroh

Department of History and International Studies,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka

Kl.nwdialor@unizik.edu.ng

Abstract

The Nigeria-Biafra war raged between July 6, 1967 and January 15, 1970. The war ended on the Nigerian side and succeeded in returning the Biafra Republic to the Nigerian state. The Federal government initiated the reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation programme hinged on the “no victor, no vanquished” mantra which would heal the wounds of the civil war and return the Igbo to the mainstream of Nigerian politics. However, in spite of these lofty goals, the dominant Igbo ethnic group of Biafra feel discontented with the treatment meted out to it by the Nigerian Federation, hence the resurgence in the agitation for a sovereign state of Biafra. This development has attracted the attention of scholars, whose works do not adopt a time perspective in analysing the causatives of this trend. The current study marks a departure from this. It analyses the causes of the resurgence in the agitation of Biafra state over time. Data for the paper is obtained from secondary sources whose validity and veracity are established by content analysis. The paper ventures to submit that the causal factors of the resurgence are attributable to the palpable injustices meted out on the Igbo ethnicity by the Nigerian state.

Keywords: *Biafra, nationhood, Igbo ethnicity, Resurgence, marginalization*

Introduction

The Nigeria-Biafra war raged between July 6, 1967 and January 15, 1970. The war ended on the side of the federal troops. As part of the post-war healing process, the federal government initiated the post-civil war Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation program, hinged on the “no victor, no vanquished” mantra. It went further to grant amnesty to key Biafran military leaders, the high point of which was the unconditional amnesty granted the Head of state of the defunct Biafra Republic, Chief Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu in 1982.¹ The main purport of the amnesty was to assuage frayed nerves, heal the wounds of the war and launch the Igbo ethnic group to the mainstream or epicentre of Nigerian life.

However, in spite of these expectations, there was a sudden resurgence in Biafran agitation for nationhood. Albeit, not on militaristic or bellicose terms as was the case with the Nigeria-Biafra war. This paper seeks to discuss the trajectory of events in a time perspective to the predisposing factors for the reinvention of Biafra's separatism and agitation for nationhood which assumed profound dimensions since 1999.

No doubt the causal factors for the resurgence of Biafran agitation for nationhood have received scholarly attention. However, the extant studies discuss but part causes of the trend: disunity in Nigeria², perceived marginalisation of the Igbo in allocation of state values and appointment into key state offices and portfolios³, the traumas associated with the memory of the Nigeria-Biafra war⁴, lopsided federal structure skewed against the Igbo⁵ and finally, the emergence of civilian democratic governance in 1999 which preserved individual and group rights and guaranteed greater freedom of expression.⁶ Other scholarly works which provide useful insights to this paper include Ikenna M. Alumona, Stephen Azum and Emeka Charles Iloh's article with the title "The Nigerian State and the Resurgence of Separatist Agitation: the case of Biafra"⁷, which used concrete data to substantiate the rise of Biafra agitation. This article is an invaluable source which provides the present study the data for a thorough and dispassionate assessment of the causal factors of the Biafran agitation. The government reactions have been viewed as infractions of the human rights of Biafrans.⁸ Similarly, the insecurity in Southeast Nigeria has been explained in terms of state Repression of Neo-Biafran separatists.⁹ Certainly, there is a plethora of literature on the Biafran agitation but most of these are works of political scientists and sociologists, who have not examined the causal factors of the agitation from time perspective and historical dimensions. In addition, none of the existing literature has examined the Biafra's separatist agitation in the context of its implications on Igbo ethnicity.

In order to address this task, this paper is organised in three sections viz: Neo-Biafrans and the movement for Secession; Impact and Significance of the Agitations; and Causes of the Recent Biafran Separatist Agitations.

Neo-Biafrans and the Movement for Secession

Like all people, who fought and lost a war, the concept "Biafra" evokes something in an average Igbo, making it possible for it to be tapped as a shared victimhood narrative for mobilisation. The first attempt to organise a movement for Biafran re-secession was in 1999, when Ralph Uwazurike, an India-trained lawyer, formed

the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). At the early stage of MASSOB, Uwazurike had claimed that it was a peaceful group and advertised what it had called a 25-stage plan to achieve its goal peacefully.¹⁰ Notwithstanding, the strategy adopted was seen as being aggressive, though peaceful, which led to his arrest on several occasions during the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007). For example, in 2005, Uwazurike was arrested and charged with treason, but the case never reached the trial stage as the first two years were spent hearing his bail application.

In 2007, Uwazurike was granted bail to enable him attend to the burial of his mother, who died while he was in detention.¹¹ As MASSOB members battled the federal government and the police at the time, the state governors in Igboland also saw them (the supporters) as irritants. In 2006, for instance, Governor Peter Gregory Obi of Anambra State issued a shoot-at-sight order against the Biafran activists who were often fingered in disturbances in the commercial town of Onitsha.¹²

In the early years of the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (who was adopted by many Igbo as 'one of their own' – in view of the fact that he hails from the neighbouring Niger Delta Region of Bayelsa State and who additionally adopted the Igbo name of 'Azikiwe') Biafran agitations continued – though more muted than they were under both the administrations of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Umaru Shehu Musa Yaradua (2007-2010). For instance, in August 30, 2011 Jonathan gave a presidential directive that all MASSOB members, detained across the country (estimated to be over 1,000 at that time), should be released immediately, including Uwazurike.¹³

The Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) led by Barrister Benjamin Onwuka, was created in the early 2000s. It is a splinter group from MASSOB, and advocates the legitimacy of Biafra. Onwuka, who hails from Item in Bende Local Government Area of Abia State and is a United Kingdom-based lawyer, was once quoted as stating that the plight of the Igbo in Nigeria, informed the birth of the BZM. As he put it, "BZM was founded, to give "seriousness" to the Biafran dream".¹⁴

On November 5, 2012, the BZM declared a new state of independent Biafra, at an event during which at least 100 peaceful protesters were arrested. To that development, Edeson Samuel, national chairman of BZM, stated that "No amount of threats or arrests will stop us from pursuing our freedom - self-determination

for Biafrans,". Concluding, he added: "We were forced into this unholy marriage but we don't have the same culture as the northerners. Our religion and culture are quite different from the northerners."¹⁵

As with most secessionist movements, MASSOB attracted a 'mixed multitude' – people with different tendencies and conflicting ambitions. Therefore, factionalisation within the movement was only a matter of time. One of the early factions, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), led by a United Kingdom-based Nnamdi Kanu, started in 2013 "when it was clear that the Ralph Uwazuruike-led movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) had been compromised by the Nigerian government and politicians after his incarceration."¹⁶ The new group also claimed that IPOB had to revive the "defunct" Radio Biafra as a "platform to educate and sensitise Biafrans who had been biased and made dormant by the propaganda fed them by the Yoruba-dominated media in Nigeria."¹⁷ This statement seems to support Uwazuruike's claim that he (and not Kanu) founded Radio Biafra¹⁸ – though the press usually mentions Nnamdi Kanu as its founder.

While Nnamdi Kanu's Radio Biafra had operated uninterrupted under the Jonathan government, it was the Buhari government that inadvertently popularised him and his Radio Biafra when the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC) started drawing the public's attention to his controversial broadcasts but proved rather ineffective in blocking the station from broadcasting in the country – despite claiming several times that it had done so.¹⁹ The government was also to, inadvertently, further promote Kanu and his radio station when it arrested him in 2015, and for close to two years, it detained him on several charges that included treason and operating a pirate Radio Biafra station. He was, as a follow-up, refused bail, despite several court rulings granting him bail. His prolonged incarceration turned him into a cult figure among his followers and stoked the ethnic solidarity of his Igbo kinsmen.²⁰

While in detention Kanu converted to Judaism and began to make even more controversial statements, with his supporters organising marches and rallies across several cities in Nigeria, Europe and North America. It is presupposed he converted to Islam in Nigeria as he was first seen in a Jewish outfit in his court appearance in Nigeria, on March 1, 2017.²¹ By the time he was granted bail on April

28,2017, he had become a cult figure among his supporters who would literally shut down cities he visited in Igboland as people trooped to get a glimpse of him.²²

Impact and Significance of the Agitations

It is believed that MASSOB has done a lot in the realm of conscientizing Nigerians and the world on the plight of the Igbo in Nigeria who constitute a majority of the Biafran republic. According to Ota, on November 1, 1999, MASSOB dispatched its Biafran Bill of Rights to the United Nations office in New York, United States of America. The bill stated that the people of Biafra, made up of the states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta and numbering about forty million people, were seeking the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra on some grounds which included the following:²³

- the 1914 amalgamation was forced on the people of Biafra;
- the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967 to 1970 that cost Biafrans more than 2 million lives was an outcome of Nigeria's aggression towards Biafra;
- the loss of that war brought Biafra and her people unwillingly back to Nigeria; and
- consequently, the aftermath of the war is that the Igbo, in particular, are treated as slaves in Nigeria.

Below is a copy of the six-point bill submitted to the United Nations office, demanding of the Nigerian government and the people:²⁴

- 1.that instruments be put in motion for the self determination of Biafra without violence;
- 2.that further lifting of oil be stopped in the Biafra area of South-east and South-south states;
- 3.that all monies belonging to Biafrans soon after the civil war be paid without further delay;
- 4.that all the abandoned properties belonging to Biafrans before the war be released;
- 5.that lives and properties of Biafrans be protected during and after the period of self-determination; and
6. that all toll gates mounted on all erosion devastated roads across Biafra be dismantled without further delay.

There are several implications of the renewed Biafra agitations. The constant protests and rallies by pro-Biafra groups and the clashes between these groups and the Nigerian security agencies have specific regional and national security implications, including the chances that the mobilisation of potential protesters could escalate armed violence and worsen the existing levels of insecurity.

Similarly, the agitations have great consequences for political stability and deepening of democratic culture in Nigeria. Although the alliance between the pro-Biafra movement and some Niger Delta ex-militants may seem not to pose much of a threat taking into account the regional dimension of the movement fuelling greater uncertainty around the general elections - particularly in the South east and the Niger Delta - it might nevertheless drive a degree of violence that could be peculiar to some individual states. At present, although IPOB may appear to have been decimated by the twin effects of the Operation Python Dance II and the proscription of what the Nigerian authorities have described as a terror group, it is not dead and neither is the Biafran movement.

The separatist agitations (by whatever names they are called) have impacted politically and socially on the Igbo and other ethnic groups in the former Eastern Region. On August 26, 2004, MASSOB made a call for a general strike and a sit-at-home order for the Igbo people and Biafrans. The Nigerian authorities at the time made frantic efforts to frustrate the plan, but were not successful. The directive for the strike was complied with by MASSOB and economic activities were paralysed in the region.²⁵

Also, the decision of the federal government, under Olusegun Obasanjo, in May 2000, to convert the dismissal of all ex-servicemen who had fought on the side of Biafra during the Nigeria-Biafra war to retirement and the decision to settle all accrued entitlements due them, were a direct fallout of the agitations by MASSOB. The same was largely true of the appointment of prominent Igbo sons and daughters to political positions under Obasanjo. These included Charles C. Soludo, who became the Central Bank Governor, Mrs Oby Ezekwesili who became minister of Solid Minerals (Mines and Steel) and later of Education, and Mrs Ngozi Okonjo Iweala who was the Minister of Finance.²⁶

Causes of the Recent Biafran Separatist Agitations

Separatist desires are not abnormal in ethnically and culturally diverse countries. It is not abnormal that some groups in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic nation-

states nurse the desires for their independence. This is perhaps why Scottish separatism has persisted in the United Kingdom despite their being part of the U.K. for over 300 years.²⁷ The same is true in Canada where Quebec separatism has been part of Canadian life since the 1890s.²⁸ In the United States, some people, especially from the southern parts of the country still fly the confederate flag, even though the American civil war was fought and won over 150 years ago. The case of Biafra has followed the same path and pattern as all the other agitations in history, except that each group has its own peculiarities in the causes and course of their agitations. The following can be said to be the inspirers of the renewed Biafran agitation:

Memories of the Nigeria-Biafra war

The memory of the civil war is very strong among the Igbo – just as the memory of the January 15, 1966 *coup* which killed several leaders of the north – is also very strong in the north. It is possible that the Igbo people's bitter memory of the war and their attempt to aggressively contest the narratives about the war create residual anger among those who fought on the federal side or animate among many in the north the bitter memories of their lost leaders during the January 15, 1966 *coup*. The anger and suspicion around the agitations for a separate Biafra may be subtle, but they help to feed into the Igbo people the feeling of being unwanted, which in turn fuels separatist sentiments.

Fear of the Igbo visibility and dominance in Nigeria's economy, politics and social spheres

In her highly regarded book, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, Yale Law Professor, Amy Chua, explores the ethnic conflict caused in many societies by disproportionate economic or political influence wielded by “market dominant minorities”. According to her, “market dominant minorities” are ethnic groups which tend to control a disproportionate share of the local economy whenever they are – often in such a manner that it triggers the envy and bitterness of the majority against them. For Chua, tension and conflicts are inherent in the relationship between ‘the economic dominant minority’ and the poor majority in the context of a liberal democracy. She argues that when free market democracy is pursued in the presence of a market-dominant minority, the almost invariable result is a backlash because...overnight democracy will empower the poor, indigenous majority. What happens is that under those circumstances, democracy does not do what we expect it to do - that is, reinforce markets. ... [Instead], she insists, democracy leads to the

emergence of manipulative politicians and demagogues who find that the best way to get votes is by scapegoating the minorities.²⁹

Chua lists the Igbo among the 'market dominant minority'. In virtually every part of Nigeria, the Igbo would be the largest ethnic group – after the indigenous group. Chua's thesis of market dominant minorities – coupled with the belief that humility and diplomacy do not seem to come naturally to many of the Igbo traders³⁰ – rather they create a generalized feeling of a group not liked by the rest of the country. For many supporters of Biafra agitators, it is this sense of not being wanted in Nigeria that justifies the quest for Biafra.

A second set of arguments for the persistence of the Biafra agitation focuses on the effects of economic frustration or absence of it on separatist feelings. It sees the current agitation for Biafra as a struggle by young people expressing resentment over their material condition – a condition which they face because of broader contradictions of the Nigerian political economy, but which they perceive as ethnic exclusion.³¹ The main argument of this perspective is that Biafra separatism is a political expression of economic frustrations of young people. These frustrations are, however, perceived by these agitators as resulting from the marginalisation of the South east in national economic life.

Contracting economic opportunities in the region, which has seen a very high level of unemployment opportunities even among the highly educated young people, account for the proneness of the area to separatist agitations and insecurity. This is deepened by a perception that other parts of the country are unduly privileged by the federal government. It is widely acknowledged that groups are more likely to rebel when they feel disadvantaged *vis-à-vis* other groups in the society.³² On the other hand, studies point to insecurity as a major disincentive to the development of the previously buoyant regional economy,³³ thereby creating a vicious circle of insecurity and underdevelopment.

Unresolved group grievances

Nigeria seems to struggle with the skills to conclusively resolve grievances by several groups in the country. One of the consequences of this is that many groups appear to have institutionalised memories of hurt or perceived sense of injustice, which they popularly express as "marginalisation." This inability to conclusively resolve group grievances has contributed to the rise of the notion that only groups with the capacity to hold the state to ransom will have their grievances addressed.

Group Identity and aspirations

Ethnicity is often used as a veneer by the elites to mask their intra-elite and intra-class struggles over power and resources. Over time, however, in Nigeria, ethnicity has acquired a more objective character, tending towards more or less an ideology and a prism through which most government measures are filtered. It is also a potent instrument of mobilisation. For instance, the fact that Nnamdi Kanu was detained for a long period of time and denied bail despite court rulings for him to be so released, stoked ethnic solidarity even from the people averse to his brand of harsh rhetoric.

The more his ethnic brethren use the refusal to grant him bail as another instance of injustice against the Igbo or more evidence of Buhari's alleged hatred for the Igbo, the more Buhari's 'kith and kin' from the north feel compelled to defend one of their own. The dominant ethnic groups routinely use threats of secession as bargaining tools when things are not going their way. The pervasive hate speeches and ethnic profiling in the media may have given some ethnic groups the belief that they are better off being on their own.³⁴

Contradictions in nation-building and integration processes

Nigeria's nation-building processes seem to be mired in deep crisis, which feeds into the crisis of underdevelopment in the country to create an existential crisis for many Nigerians. For many young people, a way of resolving the consequent sense of alienation is to retreat from the Nigerian project into idealized primordial identities - often with the Nigerian state as the enemy. For most of the Biafra agitators, Biafra represents that utopia which will shield them from all the challenges of underdevelopment and state failure experienced in Nigeria.

Additionally, there is a heavy burden of institutionalised sectional memories of hurt, injustice, distrust and even a disguised longing for vengeance. One of the consequences is that no individual or political authority enjoys universal legitimacy across the main fault lines.³⁵ In this sense, neo Biafra movements and agitations are symptomatic of the crisis in Nigeria's nation-building processes, with the Biafran agitators contesting the legitimacy of the Nigerian state - the manner in which the state is constituted and the mode of leadership recruitment into its structures.

Femi Aribisala in an article titled "Root causes of the Biafra Struggle", seems to be direct on the specifics of the causes of the agitation for Biafra's nationhood. He

observes that in the eight years of Obasanjo's presidency and that of Yar'Adua/Jonathan presidencies, there was no headline-grabbing demand for Biafra.³⁴ All peace and serenity were lost immediately President Buhari assumed office. He blamed President Buhari for the defeating Igbo demand for Biafra.³⁶

The federal character clause in section 14(3) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended) states as follows:

the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.³⁷

The Act is observed in breach under Buhari, and with a detached temperament. According to public records, the Igbo and other minority groups in the South east and South south have marginal representation in Buhari's government, while the north takes majority appointments.³⁸

President Buhari's appointment into the country's security service over the years has been widely criticised. Top appointment into the country's security service by President Buhari since 2015 seems to favour officers from the northern parts of the country. On the list of the president's appointment into the leadership cadre of the Nigerian security services, between 2015 and 2020, for instance, only two of the eight security chiefs were from the south: the Chief of Defence Staff (South West) and the Chief of Naval Staff (South-South). The remaining six, including the heads of the Army, Airforce, Police, National Intelligence Agency and State Security Service, were all northerners.³⁹

The late Yoruba activist, Yinka Odumakin, in an interview with *Business Day* on the appointments made by Buhari (from 2015 when he mounted the saddle) said various agitations to end the entity called Nigeria are directly linked to issues of Buhari's appointments. Describing the scenario as unfortunate, Odumakin noted that Nigeria was fragile because of the appointments made by President Buhari. According to Odumakin, other regions are marginally represented when discussing national security issues. Even about issues bordering on retirements, he concluded, the north always gets the lion's share.⁴⁰

Sahara Reporters of June 12, 2016, made a list of compulsorily retired officers from public service. They are 90 per cent southerners. The list is contained in appendix 111 of this research:⁴¹

Nathaniel Akhigbe, in an article published in *Business Day* of November 1, 2017, entitled "Fact-Check: 81 of Buhari's 100 Appointees are Northerners", published the appointments made by Buhari and their geo-political zones in 2015:⁴². The list is also contained in appendix IV.

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) had in 2018, after appointments, by the Buhari-led government into different federal agencies, in a statement, accused the president of unduly favouring the Muslims from northern Nigeria in federal appointments. CAN president, Samson Ayokunle, described the appointments as lopsided and against the spirit of a united Nigeria. The CAN statement had read:

Mr. Buhari on September 1 appointed Abbas Umar as the Managing Director of the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company. On September 13 he appointed Yusuf Magaji Bichi, from Kano state to replace Matthew Seiyefa from Bayelsa who had been operating in an acting capacity since Lawal Daura was sacked in his absence and on September 14, he also appointed Zainab Ahmed as the acting Finance Minister to replace Mrs Kemi Adeosun who resigned as a result of her failure to participate in the NYSC programme and for parading a forged NYSC certificate of exemption.⁴³

Going further, Ayokunle stated that:

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no dominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.⁴⁴

Also, in 2018, former President Olusegun Obasanjo wrote an open letter to President Buhari, urging him not to seek re-election, citing, among other things, his "nepotistic deployment bordering on clannishness"⁴⁵.

The former military governor of Kaduna State, Abubakar Umar(retd), also in an open letter to Buhari said that Buhari's nepotism could tear Nigeria apart. He

maintained that “Nigeria has become dangerously polarised and risks sliding into crisis on account of your administration’s lopsided appointments, which continue to give undue preference to some sections of the country over others”.⁴⁶ One of Buhari’s staunchest critics, Farooq Kperogi, described recruitment into his government as “Arewaization of appointments”⁴⁷, and many Nigerians who follow Kperogi agreed with him.

Also, as at April 6, 2021, a regional analysis of the heads of the security agencies conducted by the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) including para-military and antigraft agencies based on their state of origin showed that 12 out of 16 of them (75 per cent) were from the northern part of the country, while just four (25 per cent) were from the southern part of the country. These agencies are Defence, Nigerian Army, Nigerian Airforce, Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Police Force, Department of State security (DSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Nigeria correctional service, Nigeria Immigration Service, and Nigeria Customs Service. Others are Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Federal Road Safety Commission and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).⁴⁸ In all these federal government’s agencies, it does appear no man/woman of Igbo extraction was found eligible enough to be so appointed.

Also, Buhari’s approval of the list of the Justices of the Court of Appeal released in 2021 reflects staggering inequality, with 61 per cent of jurists coming from the north against the 39 per cent from the south. The judicial appointments once more brought to the fore the issue of his preference of northerners in key government positions.⁴⁹

Buhari’s appointments into the top management of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its subsidiaries showed an uneven geographical spread of senior appointments. Out of 40 senior management positions within the NNPC ranging from chief operating officers and managing directors of its subsidiaries to general managers’ roles in the corporation, 24 are occupied by Nigerians from the north, while those from the south head 16. The list is as follows:⁵⁰

Head of Corporation Position State of Origin

The position of the COO-Chief Operating Officer (Downstream) which Ndupu Lawrence vacated from South-East, who retired in 2020, was yet to be filled. The South-East has no representation in the internal board of the NNPC, which is saddled with the running of the day-to-day activities of the corporation. Yet, the region has two oil producing states-Imo and Abia.⁵¹ Olayinka Shehu, who works with the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) as the social media manager, goes specific as he enumerates the lopsided appointments by Buhari in the security sector:⁵² The table below may be helpful to the reader:

Head of Security Agencies and Their States of Origin⁵³

Head of institution	Agency	State of Origin	Region
Lucky Irabor	Defence	Delta	South
Ibrahim Attahiru	Nigerian Army	Kaduna	North
Isiaka Oladayo Amao	Nigerian Airforce	Osun	South
Awwal Zubairu Gambo	Nigerian Navy	Kano	North
Usman Alkali Baba	Nigeria Police Force	Yobe	North
Yusuf Magaji Bichi	Dept of State Security	Kano	North
Ahmed Rufai Abubakar	National Intelligence Agency	Katsina	North
John Mrabure	Nigeria Correctional Service	Delta	South
Muhammed Babandede	Nigeria Immigration Service	Jigawa	North
Hameed Ibrahim Ali	Nigeria Customs Service	Bauchi	North
Ahmed Abubakar Audi	NSCDC	Nasarawa	North
Boboye O Oyeyemi	Federal Road Safety Commission	Kwara	South
Dr. Liman Alhaji Ibrahim	Federal Fire Service	Niger	North
Abdulrasheed Bawa	EFCC	Kebbi	North
Bolaji Owasanoye	ICPC	Ondo	South
Buba Marwa	NDLEA	Adamawa	North

Conclusion

The paper has revealed that the Igbo desire for nationhood as epitomised in the Biafran statehood is hinged on the experiences and memories in the Nigerian state. Obviously, the Igbo aspiration appear not to be fully protected within the structures, institutions and framework engineered by other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, hence the Igbo ethnic nationality was abused, disparaged and in most occasions treated with contempt. This trend rather than abating had become deeper and increased profoundly. These necessitated the reinventing the desire for an independent state of Biafra.

Several organisation emerged to drive this aspiration, albeit, in a peaceful manner but the kinetic application of state coercive instrument by the Nigerian state radicalised these movements and in the process of self-preservation employed these movements and in the process of self-preservation employed quasi-militaristic and confrontational approach. The extra-ordinary renditioning of the leader of the independent state of Biafra in Kenya in 2021, threw a major blow to the agitation, further radicalised the agitation.

Since conclusions are often reached through data that are available, the preceding pages and the above table go to show that some part of the country is favoured above the rest and that there is a part that is almost forgotten or relegated to the background. This part of the country is the South east Region, largely inhabited by the Igbo (Biafrans).

Endnotes

1. Paul Obi Ani, *Post civil war Reconstruction, Rehabilitation & Reconciliation of Igboland, 1970-1982*(2nd Edition) (Nsukka: Great AP Express, 2012), 14
2. Innocent Chiluwá, "A nation divided against itself: Biafra and the conflicting online protest Discourses", *Discourse and Communication*, 12 (4), 2018, 357-381
3. Okechukwu Ibeanu, Nwachukwu Orji and Chijioke K. Iwuamadi, *Biafra Separatism: Causes, Effects and Remedies* (Enugu: Institute for Innovations and Development, 2016)
4. Michael I. Ugwueze, "Trauma and memory: Expaining the longevity of the Biafra secessionist movement in Nigeria", *Africa Insight*, 49 (2), 2019, 56-69
5. Jideofor Adibe, "Separatist agitations in Nigeria: Causes and trajectories", *Africa in Focus*, July 12, 2017
6. Brendan Okechukwu Aroh, "The Igbo and the Continuing Agitation for Biafra's nationhood, 1970-2021", A Ph.D Dissertation in Progress:

Department of History and International Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka

7. Ikenna Mike Alumona, Stephen Nnaemeka Azom and Emeka Charles Iloh, "The Nigerian State and the Resurgence of Separatist agitation", *Journal of Catholic Transformation and Nation Building*, 1(1), 2019
8. Magnus C Onyemaobi, Joshua O. Zacharia, Elias C. Ngwu and Innocent Ugbagu, "Separatist Agitations and Human Rights Violation in Southeast Nigeria 2015-2022", *Journal of Politics and Development*, 7 (1) June 2023, 2023
9. Chikaodiri Nwangwu, "Neo-Biafra Separatist agitations, state repression and Insecurity in Southeast Nigeria", *Society*, 60 (1), 2023, 40-53
10. "The Ultimate guide to propaganda: Educate yourself on how to recognize propaganda and create positive branding in 2022", *Adobe Express*, September 15, 2022
11. Sufuyan Ojeifo, "Kanu et al And The Frankenstein Obsession in Us", *The Bridge*, August 26, 2019
12. Ugochukwu Alaribe, "Biafra: How my mother's death freed me from detention", *Vanguard*, May 7, 2017
13. "Case against Governor Peter Obi of Anambra State", *Sahara Reporters*, October 16, 2006
14. "The Biafra Zionist Movement", *The Nation*, November 6, 2012
15. Mike Omilusi, "Endless Circle of Self-Determination Rumbling: When the Stick-and-Carrot Strategy Fails, Is Nigeria's collective Journey Still Non-Negotiable?", *Diverse Journal of Multidisciplinary Research*, 2(2) 2020, 47
16. Vincent Ujumadu, "Biafra: uwazurike tackles Kanu", *Vanguard*, July 15, 2017
17. Ujumadu, "Biafra: Uwazurike..."
18. Dr Yemi Folasade, "FG: We have jammed Radio Biafra signals", *Daily Trust*, July 15, 2015
19. Nicholas Uwerunonye, "How IPOB Leader, Nnamdi Kanu, became Buhari's Big Headache", *Independent*, April 30, 2017
20. Obinna Odogwu, "Kanu Shuts down Ebonyi", *The Sun*, July 25, 2017
21. "IPOB Leader Mazi Nnamdi Kanu Converts to Judaism, Gets Victory in Court Today", *NaijaGists.Com*, March 1, 2017
22. Ejitu Nnechi Ota, *Igbo Ethnicity in Nigeria: Origin, Evolution and Contemporary Forms* (California: Lap Lambert, 2018), 285

23. Ota, Igbo Ethnicity in Nigeria....
24. Jidefor Adibe, "Separatist agitations in Nigeria: Causes and trajectories", *Africa in Focus*, July 12, 2017
25. Ronald Mutum, "Ex-Biafra Soldiers' Pension Triggers Agitation By Other Ex-Servicemen", *Daily Trust*, August 22, 2014
26. Chris Curtis, "Why hasn't Scotland changed its mind on independence?", *The Guardian*, January 27, 2017
27. Quebec Separatists See New Hope After Brexit Vote", *Huffingtonpost*, June 24, 2016 June
28. Chua Amy, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, (New York: Doubleday, 2003)
29. Amy, *World on Fire*...
30. Amy, *World on Fire*...
31. Okechukwu Ibeanu, "Resolving the Igbo Non-Question: Pitfalls of Jibo's Single Strand Ethnic Narrative," *Premium Times*, December 6, 2015
32. Okechukwu Ibeanu, Nwachukwu Orji and Chijioke K. Iwuamadi, *Biafra Separatism: Causes, Effects and Remedies* (Enugu: Institute for Innovations and Development, 2016), 6
33. Ukoha Ukiwo and Innocent Chukwuma, *Governance and Insecurity in South-East Nigeria* (Lagos: Malthouse, 2012)
34. Adibe, "Separatist agitations in Nigeria..."
35. Adibe, "Separatist agitations in Nigeria..."
36. Femi Aribisala, "Root Causes of Biafran Struggle", *Vanguard*, December 1, 2015
37. Aribisala, "Root Causes of Biafran Struggle"
38. Aribisala, "Root Causes of Biafran Struggle"
39. Aribisala, "Root Causes of Biafran Struggle"
40. Nathaniel Akhigbe, "Fact-Check: 81 of Buhari's 100 appointees are Northerners", *Business Day*, November 1, 2017
41. Akhigbe, "Fact-Check: 81..."
42. "A list of Senior Army Officers Compulsorily Retired in Nigeria", *Sahara Reporters*, June 12, 2016
43. Olayinka Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments in six years continue to generate controversy", *International Centre For Investigative Reporting*, May 29, 2021
44. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
45. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
46. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"

47. Farooq A. Kperogi, "COAS Appointment as missed Opportunity for Unity",
Notes From Atlanta, May 29, 2021
48. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
49. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
50. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
51. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
52. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"
53. Shehu, "Buhari's Lopsided Appointments"