TOWARDS AN UTOPIC COMMUNITY: A DECONSTRUCTION OF UDOIDEM'S *VALUES AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT*

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Abstract
The question of the significance of values to national development has gained traction in research and policy works since the last century. Several scholars have highlighted different imports and dimensions of the interrelationship, which have sparked further analyses and hermeneutics, giving rise to new understandings. It is on this ground that this study intends to deconstruct Sylvanus Udoidem's text: Values and National Development. This study acknowledges some of the vagaries in the concepts which Udoidem elucidates in the text, and regards as disingenuous every attempt at discounting the variants of community for their lack of organic structure. It attempts to deconstruct the view which regards high level altruism as the only source and prime determinant of community, likening it to hanging humanity's hopes on the precipice of an 'impossible possibility.' In the end, the study, in one swoop, acknowledges the invaluable contributions of ethics to national development as well as identifies the insistence of creating a community solely on high moral grounds, as an utopic venture reminiscent of Lewis Carroll's magical dreams in Alice in Wonderland. This study employs hermeneutic method.
Keywords: Utopic community, deconstruction, Udoidem, national development

Introduction

Philosophical research on the relevance of values to development seem to have gained traction in the last quarter of the 20th century. Although ingrained in the works of ancient scholars like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Cynics, Epicurus, Stoics, etc., modern scholars have amply demonstrated the indispensability of values to societal development. Values, in their variegated forms, are essential for human interactions and growth. It is within this purview that we seek to situate Udoidem's text: *Values and National Development*.

By using a historico-comparative method, the text attempts to establish divergence in the form and nature of national development (in Nigeria) pursuant

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to the 'pre' and 'post' independent orientations of her citizens. It further attempts to elucidate on the vagaries of the concept – values, insisting that real or genuine personal and meaningful societal development can only emerge from its moral variant.

Moral or ethical values then, as cherished principle or standards of living accepted as desirable by an individual or group, are for Udoidem, creators of human community (2). As a "social *a priori*", the idea of community transcends mere interpersonal reciprocal relationships (26). "We have a community only when the conscience of our public persons are tailored toward caring for the common good as against their private interest" (30). In all intents, this identification of community with moral rectitude does not seem to align with established nuances of community which Udoidem seemingly acknowledges in various parts of his text. This essay acknowledges as disingenuous any attempt at discounting the variants of community for their lack of organic structure. It attempts to deconstruct the view which regards high level altruism as the only source and prime determinant of community, likening it to hanging humanity's hopes on a slim pulley of the 'impossible possibility.' In the end, the essay, in one swoop, acknowledges the invaluable contributions of ethics to national development, and also identifies that to insist on creating a community based solely on high moral grounds, would be as utopic as Lewis Carroll's magical dreams depicted in *Alice in Wonderland*.

Essentiality of Values to Development

In the study of ontology, essence, as one of the subcategories of act, is the act which perfects and determines a thing in its species. It is the quantity or quality which makes a thing what it fundamentally is, which it possesses of necessity, and without which it is not. Originating from the Greek οὐσία (*ousia*), the concept has strong roots in Aristotle's use of the expression *to ti ên einai* (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), literally – "the what it was to be" (Metaphysics, 1029b), and corresponds to the Scholastic *quiddity*, or Iroegbu's (1995) *kpim*. Essence is what lies at the heart of an entity; the hub around which an organism's life revolves.

Understood in this context, it becomes easy to appreciate the magnitude of the claims to essentiality of values to development. Values, by nuanced step, is imbued with diverging connotations depending on scholarly orientations. Within the pluriformity of meanings, there are four emergent significant strands, namely: the purely economic/monetary value, the functional value, the social

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value and the psychological value. While these are not mutually exclusive, as what possesses economic value could be useful for social functionality, their distinctive imports nevertheless, can at some level, be isolated from each other. A psychologically valuable entity has the potential to attract or repulse regardless of monetary, functional or social consequences.

With a terse sentence, Udoidem expresses his views of values as "cherished principles, goals or standards or ways of life held or accepted as desirable by an individual, class or society" (2). In other words, values are constituted of putative ideals that govern personal or communal lives. This looks a bit simplistic as it overlooks the need to highlight the subtleties of the layers that characterise actions. To unqualifiedly regard values as standards tends to obfuscate the subtle difference between values and norms. Ordinarily, one would expect an elaborate treatment of the concept as it constitutes one of the key pillars of his subject: *Values and National Development*. But it does seem his emphasis was more on the application of the concept rather than on its explication. Though, his emphasis on the cherished principles and goals of an individual or people as constituting values, is very instructive, his analysis fell into the trap of the tradition that frequently interchanges values with norms.

In social engineering, values are not exactly the same as norms (Tranøy). In considering Ogbujah's avowal that values are implicit and explicit assumptions or beliefs that constitute the foundation of ethical actions (208), one can rightly situate the sphere of the influence of values within the ambience of a framework, a context for the flourishing of norms. Norms are generally regarded as concrete rules that are socially enforced. They are codes of right action obligating members of a group, and serving as guide or control over what is considered appropriate behaviour (Merriam-Webster). In their essay "Values and norms", Lechner et al. view norms as action-guiding rules, which, in their multiple manifestations, can either be prescriptive (encouraging positive behaviour) or proscriptive (discouraging negative behaviour). Thus, rather than consider values as a concept equiprimordial with norms, we hold them as assumptions which constitute the groundwork for norms of behaviour. They are abstract frameworks for human actions. In other words, values constitute the structure for establishing what is right or wrong, worthwhile or worthless; while norms provide guides or standards with which to navigate through what ought to be done within specific situations (Ogbujah). For instance, having concern for the national flag is a norm, but it represents the value of deference; paying one's taxes is a norm, but it represents the value of patriotism. Values are

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operationalized in specifying norms; while norms, whether in the form of folklore, mores or laws, refer to and are justified by underlying values.

Development, on the other hand, is a complex, contested, and sometimes elusive concept that allows for multilayered processes. Whatever be its processes or dimensions, developmental strides can be couched in inclusive and functional terms to label novel, verifiable, and reliable progress in individual and social lives. It is inclusive because it entails a person's integral evolution—body and spirit; a complete growth of society which consists of human capacity development, socio-economic progress, and political stability. It is functional because it uplifts the values that enhance the sociality and happiness of human beings (Ogbujah & Opara 53-54). Holistic development is a process that creates growth, progress and positive change in the lives of individual persons and the society they occupy.

Relying on Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, and Francis Ellah's *Nigerian Society and Governance*, Udoidem crafted his thesis on person-centered development. For him, development is "a process leading to the realization of full human and environmental potentials" (25). Earlier on, he agrees with Rodney that at the level of the individual person, development entails increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being (Rodney 3). But curiously, he later disagrees with Rodney for tying the achievement of any of these indices of development to the overall condition of subsisting societies. This is oddly so, because society—as prescriber of norms, and grand custodian of individual lives, exercises overarching control over individual fortunes. For the most part, the degree of freedom an individual enjoys, or the level of creativity, skills or any other competences one is able to attain, depends directly or indirectly on one's community's ambience. If not, why then do Nigerians excel in Europe and America much more than they do in their own country? Individuals residing in states with liberal and enterprising governance have always outclassed those living under autocratic and regressive regimes in multiple indices of development. Udoidem's rejection of Rodney's subsumption of personal development to the social structure is even more curious when it is interlaced with his later affirmation of the priority of the community over the individual (31). Whatever might be behind this, societal structures are undeniable catalysts for growth—more or less.

As abstract assumptions which constitute the framework for norms of behaviour, moral values define the actions of individuals at the micro level, as well as

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determine the trajectory of development of the society, at the macro level. As the foregoing analyses have shown, values determine norms; norms impel human actions, and human actions are responsible for development. Right values engender positive development; wrong values elicit negative development. Ogbujah (in press) avers that the values a set of people cherish elicit specific types of attitudes which generate certain kinds of behaviours that engender definite sorts of development. In the essay, "Values and Growth: Insights from the Phenomenal Igbo Apprenticeship System", he notes:

> To the extent that values structure norms of behaviour, to that extent they are central to human choices. Like a rudder which determines the path onto which a ship navigates, human choices define and sustain the trajectory of societal progress. Given that every rational choice springs from an underlying value, and owing that norms—being reflective of values, determine what ought to be done in specific situations, values are thus, indispensable tools for societal sustenance. They constitute the groundworks for growth or diminution of peoples.

This strongly suggests the ineluctable tying of societal development to moral values. In other words, the *quiddity* or *kpim* of development is to be found in the espoused values. A society's growth or diminution hangs precariously on the undulations of moral values espoused by the people, both as individuals and as a group.

Udoidem moves a step further by linking the moral worthiness of values to their capacity for enhancing human wellbeing. For him, the worth of a value rests with the volume of wellbeing it brings to the overall human quest for progression, thus: "Values are said to be of moral worth if they are cherished ways of life that promote mutual welfare, ensure the common good of man as man and enhance the realization of the full human and national potential" (109). The idea is that if individual or class values do not enhance the good of others and human sociality whether in the micro communities or the nation as a whole, then such values are divested of all moral worth. Udoidem regards such worthless values as largely responsible for the throes of post-independent Nigeria.

Nigeria, since the attainment of self-rule, has been bedeviled with socio-political crises that led to an atrocious civil war which costs over 3 million lives, and is still threatening to implode the society. These crises, for Udoidem, originated at

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the bequest of the values of excessive individualism and inordinate crave for materialism, which combined to erode the pristine values of altruism with those of avarice, greed, ruthlessness, dishonesty and corruption (12). The consequences of these social vices (negative values) are manifest in lying, cheating, stealing, robbery, irresponsibility, loose sexual life (Okilo ix); shameful and disorderly scrambling for, and squandering of national treasury, circumvention of rules and laws, corruption, political intolerance, and steady drift to moral bankruptcy (Nduka 3). These, for him, are responsible for violence, internecine religious and ethnic rivalries, loss of lives and properties, and underdevelopment (14). Udoidem tries to substantiate the claim that negative moral values render the project of national development impossible by re-echoing the frustrations of Omorogbe, thus:

> How can there be development in a country in which public funds are embezzled by those who control them? How can there be development in a country where self-interest is the dominant rule of action? Nor can the economy of any country develop if its citizens lack of moral senses of duty, the right attitude to work and a senses of moral responsibility to the society…. To the extent in which moral laxity, selfishness, …etc., prevail in any society, to that extent is the development of that society obstructed and rendered impossible (197-198).

Development thus, is a function of enhanced value compass. This agrees with multiple recent data showing that people's preferences and beliefs are significantly related to various measures of socio-economic and political growth (Inglehart 1997; Hofstede 1980, 2001; and Schwartz, 2006). In matters of socio-economic development, cultural values make almost all the difference (Landes 2).

Valorisation of "Community as Person" in Udoidem's Ontology

Within sociological contexts, the divergent meanings attached to the concept 'community' are both valid and polemical. Valid, because, as one of the most accustomed notions used for designating a plethora of divergent hamlets, its core lies in the aggregation of peoples. Once a group of people follows a social structure within a society, sharing culture, norms, values, and are sustained across time and space, it is regarded as a community. Thus, a family or kindred is a community, as well as a village; a clan as well as any agglomeration of people who work together to organise social life within a particular place, is a community. Community here designates the condition of people who have or share certain common attributes, interests and goals. This allies with its

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etymological connotation—'a common unity', which, implies a sense of enduring relationships marked by intimacy, social cohesion and continuity among individuals (Nisbet 1). It is, perhaps, on this basis that Udoidem hangs his notion of individual or person as communal, and attempts to establish the ontological foundation of community on person-centred development (31).

The use of the concept is polemical given that its geographical sense delimits its applicability to only a group that inhabits a specific geographic region. In this logic, not only are people who live apart (geographically) but continue to maintain communal bonds excluded from community, those who, by accident of history, find themselves living contiguous to each other without collective values, are regarded as community. Ferdinand Tönnies ([1887] 1935) used the concepts of *gemienschaft* to indicate the close social affinities in pre-industrial communities, where everyone knew each other and bonds overlap, and *gesellschaft* to designate urban, post-industrial communities where members play designate roles without essentially knowing each other. His choice of *gemienschaft* as an ideal community over *gesellschaft* drew the ire of social scientists like Emile Durkheim who argued that the idealisation of this typology was dangerous for growth because close-knit communities are prone to adhering to traditions that demand strict compliance and reinforce individual oppression (Zeyallos).

In *Values and National Development*, Udoidem was emphatic in rejecting the contractarian notion of community, calling the reduction of community to external collectivity (Schmitz 247) as well as its inflation to the collective individual as mere illusions of community. In his avowal:

> What must be noted here is that, the fact that the word community is used by contractarians to describe a network of relationships among individuals does not mean that such relationships really constitute a community. Even though this experiential network is an important and even essential requirement in human association, the position of this paper is that a community is not merely the reciprocity of its individuals, neither their external nor their internal reciprocal relations. The nature and reality of community should neither be identified simply with interpersonal relationships nor merely conceived as an artificial construction, rather it should be understood as a social *a priori*, something that transcends mere interpersonal reciprocal relationships.

What this suggests is that community is not to be found in individual collectivity or reciprocated affiliations of persons inhabiting a contiguous space. Community is a social *a priori*, which transcends networks of relationships.

Drawing inspiration from Michael Novak's affirmation that "each human community is to be judged in the light of how it promotes the full development of all its individual members" (178), Udoidem set forth to volarise his notion of community as person. For him, any meaningful analysis of the concept of community must emphasize the notion of 'individual as communal', since on it lies the possibility of grasping the ontological foundation of community, which sheds light on the declaration that any form of community development should be person centred (31). In other words, the human person is at the centre of community, or put differently, the community is realised in persons. A nation is made up of persons, and since the worth of a nation is dependent on the actions of people inhabiting it, the best way to develop a nation is by developing the persons within the nation (111). Hence, for development to be authentic, factual and reliable, it must be person-centred since the ontological foundation of community lies in the person.

In a twist of intellectual lithe, Udoidem moves a step further to declare the ontological priority of community over the person. In his words, "not only is community prior to the individual as such, but it normally out-lasts him. According to Aristotle, the principle of human form resident in the individual is the very ground of community. It is the underlying principle for common brotherhood" (31). He interprets Aristotle's principle of human form as an out-directed kernel that engenders interrelationships and altruistic behaviour. Thus, the individual, by constitution, is not restricted to his individuality, rather, he is ontologically open to communality. Human communality neither belongs to an assemblage of people consigned to a geographic setting, nor to any abstract idea of politics or religion. Human communality belongs to the human person as part of his ontological constitution (31). Our individuality is not absorbed in, nor lost in the maze of communality, but is rather enhanced by communality. Our individuality is warranted precisely in the humanity that is common to all (32). On these bases, Udoidem concludes that if the community were to be developed, the focus of the development must be the human person.

Towards an Utopic Community: Hermeneutic Recreation

The notion of community as thus elucidated demands further clarifications. Insightful as it might be, the idea of streamlining what constitutes 'community as person' and the attendant delisting of 'quasi' or slightly different forms of

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relationships as community, seem to suggest that community is a grandiose superstructure bereft of all flecks. At the global level, it is ingenious, following Aristotle's ontology, to locate the germ or quiddity of community in the human form. In his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle identifies the "substantial" form as a kind that is attributed to a thing, without which that thing would be of a different kind or would cease to exist altogether. All individuals possess the "substantial" form of human existence. Humanity, as an abstract concept, is concretised in the existent individual human beings. Without individual existent beings, there is no humanity; there is no community. Like shrubs converging into a forest, every individual is an ineluctable part of the human family, the human community. This, perhaps, explains why Udoidem seems confident in stressing that the human form is the underlying principle for common brotherhood (31).

Within the spectrum of projects that seek the elimination of discrimination and enhancement of overall human lives, Udoidem's avowal finds support in the mission of *World Philosophical Forum*—an organisation that partners with *UNESCO* in propagating the principle of common humanity of all peoples. With its mission as to use the best philosophical ideas to educate, consolidate and transform humanity into an integrated 21st century global citizenship, the organisation seeks to use the values of wisdom, reason, morality, global responsibility and justice to fight off such current vices as double standards, corruption and falsehood. In his presentation at the Forum's *8th Annual Dialectical Symposium, Athens* (2nd - 7th October, 2017), Ogbujah acknowledges the condensation of the world into a unit akin to that of the family by globalizing forces, and argues that beyond the trappings of old national, ethnic, political or religious allegiances, we have an added layer of responsibility to care for each other as members of the world-wide community who share same global identity (110-111). In this perspective, Udoidem's 'community as person' resonates with establishing global citizenship that is grounded in the ethics of care, tolerance and empathy. Hannah Arendt (1958) sees in it the development of "an ethic of care for the world."

Perhaps, it is precisely this innate capacity for openness to the other grounded in the human seed, and which is echoed in global citizenship that needs further clarification. Based on these presuppositions, Udoidem prioritizes the community over the individual. Using Aristotle's principle of human form resident in the individual, he went on to hierarchize the community thus: "not only is community prior to the individual as such, but it normally out-lasts him" (31). This is understandable if the basis of comparison is on existence or

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performance within space-time contingency. Community, as an abstract reality, definitely subsists its individual members. From ancient to contemporary times, communities have buried billions of individual human beings. But to compare an abstract concept with an existent material entity, and to further rely on such false comparison to make judgement regarding their longevity, is at best, problematic. Abstract entities, as ideal beings, are not subject to growth and diminution to which material real beings are condemned. Baring new discoveries that may lead to reformulation of abstract concepts, they exist as is, until the end of time, unlike material contingent beings with life cycles.

Nonetheless, given that the concept of community is an abstract human creation, that is, it does not have real existence, it means that its existence is dependent on persons. Without individual persons, there is no community. The reality of community both as a construct and as an agglomeration of individuals, depends on persons. Consequently, the individual possesses ontological priority over the community. Community is but a structure that enhances the individuality (individual uniqueness and progress) and sociality (capacity to relate with other similar individuals) of persons, it is not prior to the individual person. Although the community provides individuals with the space for the realization of sublime lives, and for which its prioritization has been dubbed an "anthropological factum" (Udoidem, 31), its very existence is dependent on individuals. Individual human beings have both ontic and ontological priority over the community.

This conceptualization of the priority of the individual over the community seems to be at odds with African communalism. Following the works of Menkiti, Kanu, Iroegbu, Wiredu and Gyekye, it will be disingenuous to hierarchize the individual over the community. According to Gyekye, "it is evidently true that in the social context, in terms of functioning or flourishing in a human community, the individual person is not self-sufficient" (105). Iroegbu is perhaps, more emphatic in noting that to be a human person is to belong to humanity. As the existent person realizes himself only in a concrete human society, there is no humanity or persons without the community (129). This totally resonates our earlier postulations in *The Idea of Personhood*, where, using ethno-philosophical tools, we established the ontological priority of community over the person in African thought pattern. Persons are persons primarily because they commune in the commonwealth of communal selfhood (142). This conceptualization is, of course, largely responsible for creating, in Africa, traditions that demand strict compliance and reinforce individual oppression. But owing to the apparent

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distinction between the 'individual' and the 'person' which makes it possible for individuals to fail in personhood in African philosophy (Menkiti, 172), it becomes apposite to insist on the priority of the individual over the community. As springing from human seed, individuals are both the subjects that conceptualise community, as well as the basis upon which the reality of community rests. The idea of community dies naturally at the demise of every individual human being.

Furthermore, Udoidem draws up a pseudo distinction between rural development and community development, and with this, is able to set up an ideation of community which, by all intents and purposes, is utopic in structure, thus:

> A community is developed when the full human potentials are harnessed for the purpose of promoting mutual welfare, growth, creativity and meaning in striving for good over bad right over wrong…. We have a community only when the conscience of our public persons are tailored toward caring for the common good as against their private interest (30).

The implications of these sweeping statements are enormous. First, it means that unless the *full human potentials are harnessed* for common good, there is no development in such a community. This criterion appears a bit too strong given that it is not existentially possible to fully harness human potentials whether in an individual's lifetime or the lifespan of a community. To withdraw ascribing development to a community until the time when the full potentials of her members are exploited, will tantamount to atomizing community development as an ideal static condition; a linear, unidirectional process. But since, like peace, community development instead relates to existing social conditions, which are never finished products, but always a "work in progress"; a complex and multifaceted dynamic process that can be measures more or less, it means communities can still be developed without realizing the full potentials of her members.

Secondly, grounding the existence of a community to altruistic behaviours of its constituent individuals, not only prioritizes the individual over the community (which he already rejected), but creates a *nouveau* contraption which could be called 'moral community.' Typically, moral community is characterized by social and moral integrations. Any group such as a religious sect or military unit, espousing common ethical values, may be regarded as a moral community. Émile Durkheim uses the term to label rural communities with organic structures as opposed to urban depersonalized settings. This, however, is markedly

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different from Udoidem's community which is based on moral uprightness and the care for the common good. To deny that a social group constitutes a community just because of immoral behaviours of its members is quite novel; to insist that a community exists only when the moral probity of public persons result in the promotion of the common good as opposed to private interests, would at best, lead to the non-existent of communities. There is no flawless community. To envision a community whose leaders have continual capacity to scale the moral hurdle is great, but to create that community in reality, is but a figment of the mind.

Besides, Udoidem seems to decry the idea of encouraging affluent citizens to plough back some of their resources for the development of their rural communities on two fronts. First, he thinks it is an incentive for public servants to embezzle public funds in order to use same to launder their images among rural dwellers. Second, he envisages a lopsided development given that some communities might not have affluent indigenes to help them out. For these reasons, he regards the "return home" strategy for community and rural development as morally bankrupt (28). But a hermeneutic analysis of this inference reveals some significant fault-lines. One, the first reason for his objection assumes that wealthy individuals must be public servants who have embezzled public funds. This is far from reality given that in Igbo communities, for instance, wealthy individuals are usually entrepreneurs who have gained market shares. Oftentimes, they heed this call to "return home" by either taking up public projects like road constructions, pipe born water, electricity, etc., or by empowering other members of the community through scholarships and business grants. The phenomenal Igbo apprenticeship system which recently won approval by Harvard Business Review as a veritable tool for 'stakeholder' capitalism, has facilitated burgeoning entrepreneurial communities in Igboland. No wonder, prior to current state-induced crises in the region, the 2015 UNDP's National Human Development Report notes that the Southeast geo-political zone is not just the most balanced and economically stable part of Nigeria, but the most human security secure zone, with the highest level of human wellbeing (97-98). This "return home" strategy has indeed, facilitated community development in Igboland much more than any other geopolitical zone of the country.

Secondly, the fears regarding the possibility of the strategy engendering lopsided development is unfounded. Ordinarily, community development is the prerogative charge of those in control of the common wealth—the government. Government would be shirking her responsibility if she were to leave it entirely

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into the hands of private citizens. Great as the contributions of affluent individuals might be to the development of their indigenous communities, their efforts can only complement government's works. So, to be overly concerned about the possibility of some indigenes developing their communities more than other indigenes is groundless. In point of fact, as members of different families or communities are imbued with uneven measures of financial muscles, so would their developments be. It will be disingenuous to dissuade some from embarking on community development because others are not able to, or outrightly refuse to develop theirs. Moreover, unevenness is the hub that drives the wheel of capitalism.

For the most part, the apparent paradox in Udoidem's labelling of the "return home" strategy as morally bankrupt, manifests in his acquiescence with Michael Novak's thesis that "the highest development of individual persons is not reached if those individuals remain self-enclosed, impervious to their brothers and sisters, and shut off from habits of co-operation, civic spirit, and personal contribution to [the] development…" (32). Which means, whilst egoistic and un-cooperating attitudes are condemned, altruistic behaviours are praised as marks of a developed person. Given this ideation, it beats the mind to attempt to fault the call for individuals to open up and extend helping hands to their kith and kin, and to personally contribute to the development of their communities.

Conclusion

The text *Values and National Development* is quite relevant, especially following incidents that have marred progress since Nigeria got independence from British colonial rule. Currently, it is even much more topical given the spate of corruption, injustice and security challenges the country is forced to endure. Perhaps, there is no better time to reflect on the imports of values to national development than now; and perhaps, there is no better time to reread such works to make them fit into the current realities, than now. This is the impetus grounding this hermeneutic recreation.

In spite of some outlined enigmatic posturing, credit must be given to this ingenious idea of identifying national development with moral values. Moral values, for Udoidem, are inseparably tied to societal development. For if individual or class values do not foster the good of others, the society or nation, then such values have no moral worth (109). Such worthless values, for him, are largely responsible for the de-development of the Nigerian nation.

Additionally, Udoidem underscores Omoregbe's ideation that "to talk of national development is to talk primarily of the development of the human person" (195). Real or authentic development therefore, must be person centred. This implies that, within this context, national development would consist in the development of the human persons (111). Because Udoidem places optimal regard on moral development within the continuum of human development, he found it expedient to concede that when persons in a nation are morally developed, then economic and political developments will become a natural consequence (111). But this can hold sway only if the assumption on the importance of moral or ethical development is preceded by the acknowledgement of intellectual development. For the most part, the intellect has primordiality over morality in human configuration. Man is first rational before being ethical. A nation that produces 'ethical or moral giants' and 'intellectual dwarfs' cannot make headway in technological advancement. Similarly, a nation that produces 'intellectual giants' and 'ethical dwarfs' increases obstacles to its own growth (Omoregbe, 199-200). Hence, socio-political growth cannot be automatically elicited from moral or ethical growth in isolation of intellectual development.

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