

## **TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA: NEW WARS AND NEW RESPONSES IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND SECURITY**

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### **Abstract**

*In this paper, I shall argue the view that terrorists in West Africa require poor social situations to emerge. However, where governments of different countries are committed to changing the social condition in their states, terrorists would rarely find a compelling evidence to appeal to in West Africa. Besides, I insist that the terrorists of the West African sub-region seek to realize a goal: to establish an Islamic theocracy, and this, in spite of other possible options. For counterterrorism, the West African governments employ two different approaches: the deployment of the military, and the nonmilitary methods. Although the military option has become a necessity once the terrorists announce their presence by means of force, the nonmilitary approach depicts a far-reaching means for checkmating the terrorists proactively. The nonmilitary approach forces governments to effectively alter the poor circumstances, and put in place the requisite. By toning down the military approach, Kaldor, I shall explain, de-emphasizes the military approach.*

**Keywords:** Terrorism, New Wars, Peace and Security, Social Condition, Mary Kaldor.

### **Introduction**

In this paper, I shall identify the degenerating social condition shaping country differences in West African sub-region as the ground on which terrorism thrives. Why do such conditions ground extremist, and violently, organized crime? Why do governments of the sub-region not pay close attention to the prevailing social condition of the states they govern? Will terrorists emerge in a society which condition has improved to a high degree? "Social condition," here represents the state of affairs of any society or community, which government has the responsibility to improve. When any government fails to provide the people's basic needs, offer the people requisite care and services, job opportunities and welfare; when government neglects giving the people a reason to live for, and

refrains from fulfilling its own part of the contract, then the government is stoking the embers of terrorism in its country.

Thus, degraded social condition implies that responsible governance is at stake. Truly, when a high percentage of any country's population becomes victims of terrorism, or state repression, then there emerges the need to tackle issues of governance. Hence, there is a relationship between poor social condition and responsible governance. To manage the common good is a task of responsible governance. The ultimate objective of governance is to attain a just state. Against the Sophist, Thrasymachus, who views justice as the will of the mighty ("might is power"), Plato argues, in his *Republic*, for a just state. Justice is for him the ultimate objective of any state. In this light, Plato's reason for arguing that the state be rooted on justice is simply the view that without justice, it is all too dangerous to exist in a society. There is hardly safety of life and property, as Hobbes insists.

Where "terror" stands for acts of violent deaths, "terrorism" refers, in West Africa, to "a battle tactic within irregular forces in a developing world" (Kleinfeld and Muggah 2019). I shall argue the view that terrorists, who make the most of those social conditions, would find it hard to emerge, should West African regional governments transform the poor social conditions in their states. Furthermore, by altering, and improving the social circumstances, the governments of the various states in West African sub-region would root out terrorism. Changing the social condition entails building legitimate institutions, putting in place effective justice mechanisms, provision of social care and services, provision of security and peace, countering fundamentalist narrative in a rights-based rule of law and in a democracy (Kaldor 2019). It would have been appropriate to give a detailed account of the processes of building legitimate institutions, the justice mechanisms mostly needed, and the type of responsible leadership that would make for responsible governance in West African countries. However significant such details remain to this paper, I shall not wade into them. The reason is simply because obtaining the requisite data, oftentimes, proves an uphill task for all the West African states. Again, I shall be on the ground to authenticate the data. Suffice it then to illustrate my arguments with Nigeria, and refer to other countries as the need arises.

After the introduction, of which this outline forms a part, I shall discuss, in Section One, terrorism in West Africa. Kaldor's distinction of the "new" and "old" wars

forms the core of Section two. Section three focuses on building legitimate institutions, providing justice mechanisms, peacemaking processes and countering fundamentalist narratives. Section four critically examines the relevance of the two approaches as they concern West Africa, before the conclusion.

### **Terrorism in West Africa**

In this section, I shall specify the terrorist groups operational in West Africa, their links to international terrorist groups, their supply chain, and how urgent it is to obstruct this chain.

West Africa constitutes, presently, the locus of terrorist activities in the Sub-region. As a “battle tactic,” terrorism is a ploy to dismember the states in the region. If traditional (“old”) wars built the state, contemporary (“new”) wars, which terrorists, bandits, mafias fight, aim at dismembering the state (Kaldor 2019). Terrorism tears the state apart. Pat Utomi makes an unsettling claim about Boko Haram terrorist fighters and terrorism in West Africa. Utomi argues that any citizen could have recognized Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Concerning Boko Haram, Utomi (2011:2) writes,

I did some analysis with data coming straight from the government. In the last seven years, 39.7 per cent of Nigeria’s resources have gone to Abuja. The next city, which is where Boko Haram is from, has received the lowest government spending 1.2%, followed by the South East 2.1%. When you hear Boko Haram, you hear about the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). Those things don’t come by accident, you could see how they are developing. We have seen kidnapping all over the South East. The States are declining, the governors are itching always to go to Abuja and collect allocation and buy new 4 wheel drives. They are not prepared to do what Awolowo did, creatively find ways to bring prosperity to the people. They are not doing that anymore.

Utomi intends his audience to understand that the Nigerian Government was well-informed about the emergence of Boko Haram. Had the governors of Northern Nigeria and the Federal Government paid a little attention, they would have forestalled the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency. Utomi’s most telling claim was that the Nigerian government could have nipped Boko Haram at its

bud, but failed to. Government of Nigeria failed largely because responsible governance has taken flight from the country. In much the same way as Utomi, Bill Clinton held President Jonathan blame-worthy for the rise of Boko Haram insurgency. Clinton's arguments pointed largely to the different social circumstances between the poverty-stricken North and the relatively flourishing South. Unknown to Clinton, the North has held on to power for a three-quarter of Nigeria's existence. Hence, some thinkers discountenanced Clinton's critique. At present, Nigeria is not at war, and indeed all other countries in the same West African sub-region. None is at (state-to-state) war. Yet, violent death statistics in West African countries, by far, overshoots beyond violent death statistics of countries at war. The terrorist groups tend not to consider any other option than the social circumstances in West African countries. This is because such a condition produces lawlessness and brazenness in flouting the rule of law. In such a society, there abounds no pursuit of any high ideal. Rather, crimes, and famine affect the youths, who easily embrace any ideology to eke out a living. Generally, the ruling party neglects to reach out to such communities.

The emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria is traceable to a number of socio-political, cultural, religious and economic factors. Northern Nigeria's politicians have made efforts to establish the Sharia Law Code as the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria but failed. The religious identity of Boko Haram and its operations illustrate features that resonate with the religious objective of Northern Nigeria's politicians. Some governors of Northern Nigeria have gone as far as declaring the Sharia Law Code as the sole constitution in their states. On the one hand, it is a ploy to win votes at elections. On the other hand, it is life-threatening to the Christians and people of other faiths. Generally, the Federal government gave such actions of the state governments little or no attention, and made hardly any move to forestall it. Hence, Boko Haram, originated from northern Nigeria within those cultural and religious, socio-political upheaval. Thus, Boko Haram terrorists enjoy the support of some politicians, and judges, who work covertly for Boko Haram terrorists. Those terrorists are linked to other terrorist groups like Al-Qeada. Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in West Africa (Blanchard and Cavigelli 2018). It also has a strength of more than 4000 to 6,000 fighters.

The Islamist fighters in Mali comprehend the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar al-Dine. The French colonial rule marginalized

the Tuareg in Mali. Ever since that time, the marginalization has not ceased to cause ripples in Mali. The consequence was the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. While Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azwad (MNLA) had a national territorial orientation, the Tuareg Islamist fighters are “subtypes of Al-Qeda-inspired groups, linked with other criminal networks in the Sahel” (Maiangwa 2014). The spread of the Islamist terrorist groups took a process of “diffusion” and “contagion.” The terrorists in North and West Africa forge alliances with international terrorist groups to “enhance their operational capacity and enable them to withstand counter measures by states and international actors” (Maiangwa 2014: 22). Thus, countries like Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad are the particularly affected states. The United States (U. S.) and its allies, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the West African sub-region’s coalition of military forces (MTJN) and individual governments - all employ both military and nonmilitary approaches to fight terrorism. Typical terrorist groups in West Africa include the Boko Haram of Nigeria and their splinter groups like Ansar al-Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the Signatories in Blood, and Al-Qeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQUIM). They all are united by a singular goal - the establishment of Islamic theocracy in the Sub-region.

Significant for counterterrorism in West African sub-region is the need to cut off the supply chain of the terrorists. This is because the supply chain guarantees the “funding and the logistics network used by violent extremists” to promote the various terrorists’ insurgencies (Kwarkye, 2020). The supply chain cuts across nearly all the states in West African sub-region. Accordingly, the supply chain shows the terrorists’ comprehensive network for the purchase of ammunitions and funding of their logistics network. Through several avenues, especially through the coastal routes of such countries as Burkina Faso, Togo, Ghana, Benin Republic, and Nigeria, terrorists make their purchases. It is imperative for these “coastal states” to obstruct the route of the supply chain. There has been the deployment of military force to stamp out the supply chain. The coalition forces of the governments of Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast attempted obstructing the supply chain. Named operation Comoé, the coalition forces dealt a huge blow on the terrorists. The onslaught captured 38 terrorists, killed 8 terrorists and destroyed the terrorists’ training camps (Kwarkye 2020). The governments of Burkina Faso and Togo had a reason to obstruct further expansion of the terrorists Southwards - to forestall the spillover of terrorists into their countries and the nefarious

activities of the terrorists. The governments of Burkina Faso and Togo also engaged in nonmilitary measures as well.

The Institute of Security and Studies (ISS) conducted a research about the flow of funds to the terrorists as well as the build-up of their logistics network. Through illegal trade, terrorists fund the purchase of arms, fuel, foodstuffs and motorbikes. Robust motorbikes are employed to navigate the difficult terrain. They are fuel economical, and may convey more than a person at the same time. Purchased in Niger's Tillabéry region, the motorbikes are transported from Nigeria, through the Togolese border town of Cinkase, and Burkina Faso's Boucle du Mouhoun region. Some of the motorbikes are transported from Togo to Burkina Faso and some of the motorbikes end up in Niger.

Burkina Faso's city Boucle du Mouhoun and Niger's Tillabéry are "hotspots for violent extremism" (ISS). It is also worth noting that terrorists do not engage in any trade. Rather, they more likely gain access to the goods through some gangsters, merchants and entrepreneurs. These accomplices make a living out of illicit trade. In West Africa, extremists also source fertilizer as an essential component for fabricating explosives. From northern Ghana, the materials are smuggled to Burkina Faso in large quantities. Populated by "small-scale mining and artisanal" (ISS), the northern Ghanaian region is home to many illegal miners of different nationalities like Burkinabe, Togolese, and even the Ivorian former rebels and others.

In Burkina Faso, gold mining is under the supervision of extremist groups. In 2017, the governments of the region - Burkina Faso, Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana, jointly called for an extraordinary ECOWAS Summit. The Summit never went beyond decrying the havocs that terrorists perpetrated in the sub-region. Further, ECOWAS Priority Action Plan (2020-2024) has failed to address the poor social services and social condition in West Africa. Hence, ECOWAS lacks the capacity and technology to trace various shipments to their real destination. The capacity is not only limited, the requisite technology is lacking equally. Consequently, border officials lack the digital up-to-date equipment for tracking the consignments and effective capacity to impede the terrorists' supply chain. The coastal states acknowledged the need for surveillance, tracing the root causes of extremist terrorism to poor social conditions, like network of roads, famine, healthcare, the development deficits, and poor governance. Terrorists exploit the

poor social condition to “penetrate and implant themselves in communities” (ISS). In March 2019, Burkina Faso spearheaded the Otapuana operation in Southern Burkina Faso to flush out the terrorists. Though the success of the onslaught led to the killing of the 8 terrorists, the capture of 38 terrorists, the onslaught did not wholly have the expected impact as designed.

Violent extremism in the West Africa needs to be addressed as a complete whole. The first stage is to uncover the terrorists’ covert dealings, their entrepreneurs, accomplices, and politicians sponsoring the extremists. Doing so exposes the politicians providing cover for and sponsoring terrorists. A move to expose the sponsors of Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria caused a row in a country where Boko Haram fighters have already been ravaging some parts of the country! The second is this: the West African states necessarily have to face up to the poor social conditions, equip border officials for adequate border surveillance, and strengthen border control in terms of capacity and technology.

To sum up, two different approaches for counterterrorism are remarkable. The use of force challenges the terrorists militarily. Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) – Lt. General Buratai (2020), maintains the view that “dialogue is not a military option for tackling banditry, kidnapping and other heinous crimes” bedeviling the North-west region of Nigeria. None use of force (politicking, rehabilitation, e.t.c.) rescues the youths, who are ruminating on the possibility of being a terrorist. Indeed, the nonmilitary approach recommends itself for its numerous advantages.

### **Terrorists’ Wars as Kaldor’s “New” Wars**

New wars are generally “often invisible but ever more fought at a distance, ever more targeting the civilian population, in extreme forms of violence, and involving the states in many ways, but not solely fought by states” (Randeria 2017: 1). Rather than Kaldor’s “new” and “old” wars, some thinkers employ other terms like “contemporary” wars, or “today’s” wars. For “old” wars, some thinkers make use of the term, “traditional” wars. In this section, I shall address typical terrorists’ wars, while making use of Kaldor’s distinction between new/old wars. I shall also answer the question, why terrorists find meaning in such wars. I shall underline the features of the new and old wars, and their significance.

Advanced by the British academic – Mary Kaldor, “new” wars concept typifies a form of warfare in a post-Cold war period (Kaldor 2012). The features are as follows,

- Violence between varying combinations of state and non-state networks.
- Fighting in the name of identity politics as opposed to ideology.
- Attempts to achieve political, rather than physical control of the population not through the state, but through fear and terror.
- Conflict financed not necessarily through the state, but through predatory means that seek the continuation of violence.

For Kaldor, any definition of the new war had better be “analyzed in the context of globalization” (Kaldor: 2019). She maintains that the idea of *new* war does not depict necessarily an original, novel creation of hers. Some scholars have already identified similar ideas like Shaw’s terminology, “degenerate warfare.”

Kaldor insists that her critics over-generalize the arguments. She writes, “One of the problems of many of my critics is that they lump together the different versions of the argument and treat one particular aspect as a criticism of the whole argument” (Kaldor, 2013: 4). Kaldor disputes the critics’ attitude and contrivance to do away with her distinction. Contemporary wars refer to “organized violence” in the ilk of terrorist violent conflicts. New wars could be ethnic-inspired wars. Nonstate actors like mercenaries, terrorists, gangsters, mafia invest in new wars. New wars entail pro-democracy violent conflicts, and a combination of gangster violent activities” (Kaldor 2000:1). Moreover, by her distinction, Kaldor has drawn a demarcation between “twenty-- first century” organized violence and “twentieth century” wars (Kaldor 2013: 1-16). For Kaldor (2013:1-2), both types of wars - “new” and “old” - are virtually not diametrically opposed since the two terms - new and old - are not strictly distinct. “A research strategy and a guide for policy,” “thinkers require the distinction to grapple with the overall logic inherent in contemporary violent conflicts,” writes Kaldor (2013: 1). In spite of the differences, it is the logic of wars that markedly differentiates them sharply.

It is particularly the logic of the new wars that makes all the difference (Chinkin et al 2020: 1; Kaldor 2013:3). The logic of new wars actually refers to the “social



condition or mutual enterprise in which the various armed groups have more to gain from continuing the violence than from winning or losing” (Chinkin and Kaldor 2017:7). The logic of new wars prolongs the war with intermittent periods of cessation of hostilities, and so, makes peace agreements elusive, often long winding and irritating (Chinkin and Kaldor 2017:7). It enables the parties to profit politically and the economically. New wars are anti-state, but the old wars are state-specific. In old wars, regular armies of the state, are clad in uniform, and flying the state flag, the regulars defend the marked boundaries against the enemy (Keen 2012; Kaldor 2013:3). The logic of underlying old wars is apparently simple: to win decisively, never to lose.

### **Necessity for Building Legitimate Institutions**

My aim in this section is to show the need for building legitimate institutions. I shall make it clear that the mismanagement of existing ones and the urgency to put in place up-to-date ones. It behooves a responsible governance to face up to the task. In this section, I explore Kaldor’s nonmilitary approach, which relies on a number of ideas like building legitimate institutions, effective justice mechanisms, and the rule of law in a democracy. This is logically related to her concept of “new” wars. Building legitimate institution relates to leadership and responsible governance.

### ***Leadership and Governance***

Governance entails the three arms of government - the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary - working together, while existing independently. In his *Bill of Rights*, Hegman (2011:2) argues that a government might *do too little* but it must actually engage in so much responsibility. Nigeria’s history spans four republics: the First Republic (1966-1979), the Second Republic (1979-1983), the third Republic (1983-1999), the Fourth Republic (1999-till date). Nigeria has performed poorly indeed in its leadership orientation. From the 1<sup>st</sup> Republic through to the 4<sup>th</sup> Republic, its leaders have consistently displayed lack of political will to address issues of corruption, abuse of human rights, mobilization of human and material resources. In spite of the oil boom, Nigeria has made irregular attempts at the mechanization of its agriculture. Consequently, it is unable to feed its growing population. It has the highest global out-of-school children (ca. 110.5 million). In terms of infrastructure, it makes a poor showing: collapse of industries, poor medicare, poor network of roads and transportation facilities. They all indicate Nigeria’s failure to address the degenerating facilities.

The social situation in Nigeria is emblematic of other states in West African sub-region. About Africa's most populous state (202 million), Nigeria boasts of the highest percentage of youth population (The World Bank of Nigeria: Overview 2019). Multi-ethnic and divergent cultures, Nigeria has "the largest growing economy and the biggest democracy" in West Africa (United States Institute of Peace 2019:1). The significant thing about its democracy is the low turnout of voters at elections. This fact is critical to the growing distrust of the citizenry in respect of the government. The distrust is one of the lowest in Africa (Afrobarometer recorded 30%). All that point to the indispensable task ahead in "improving the national, state and local governance" (United States Institute of Peace 2019:1). The country has held several elections. The 2019 national elections marked the 6<sup>th</sup> consecutive elections since the 4<sup>th</sup> Republic (1999). Critical for the Buhari-led government is commitment to fighting corruption, guaranteeing security of life and property, boosting the people's living standard, diversification of the economy and enhancing climate related issues. Rather than through the ballot box, the court of law has become the source of guaranteeing election.

### *Effective Justice Mechanisms*

This is a sphere germane for effective governance. It is the attraction of democracy. An effective legal framework ensures settlement of conflicts between states and the individuals, and among groups. Simbine and Oladeji (2010:819) reveal "critical oscillations and dwindling fortunes" in Justice Department since the 1960. In the First Republic, the judiciary was partisan. It hardly checked the excesses of the then government. The military era was the worst. It operated with military decrees and there was no governance. Through the second to the fourth Republics, there have been controversial judicial outcomes throughout the different Presidential elections. Among the cases that come to mind is the forced replacement of Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) Onoghen, with an Islamic Judge who specialized in Islamic Law Code. President Buhari singlehandedly replaced Onoghen for a flimsy reason. Another outrageous example is the Imo state gubernatorial case. In this case, the winner of the election was stripped of his office and another candidate, who pooled the least percentage of votes in the election, was declared the winner! The supreme court of justice delivered the judgment. For ineffective justice mechanisms, Nigeria was classified together with the war-ravaged countries like Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo

(Legislature Institute's 10<sup>th</sup> Annual Prosperity Index). Sometimes, citizens who speak truth to power are hindered.

### *Security and Peace*

#### (i) Security

Security is a core goal and primary purpose of governance. This is stated clearly in Sect. 14(2b) of 1999 Nigerian Constitution. The 1999 Constitution has remained the basis for the Fourth Republic. In spite of the multilevel spheres of security in Nigeria, there is hardly security of lives and property. The emergence of Boko Haram insurgency, the reprisals of the Pastoralist Nomads of the Fulani ethnic-nation, the decimation of the civilian population at the hands of the various gangsters, bandits, drug cartels, mafia - they all display the failure of the government to secure the citizens' lives and property. Nigeria's government has failed to realize the urgency in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency. A change of orientation in the prosecution of the war against terrorism in Nigeria may suggest community policing, an understanding cooperation among various agencies, and strengthening local security. This entails accountability of the security personnel to citizens active in the safety of their lives and property.

St Augustine's principle of government reads: "Remove justice and what is human community but a band of robbers." Augustine depicts, by this principle, the reason for the maintenance of effective justice mechanisms. The absence of these mechanisms leads to untoward behaviour like violence and insecurity. In Nigeria, and in other countries of the sub-region, violent death rates far overshoot those of countries engaged in war. Two reasons account for it. Terrorism is the first one, whereas state repression is the second one. Because their countries could not vote the leaders out through general elections, the same politicians get themselves re-elected. The increase in state violence inhibits individuals from speaking truth to power. Mismanagement, poverty, and marginalization all squeeze life out of responsible governance. So corrupt are politicians that a retinue of paramilitaries and state outfits guard them from any harm!

### *Peacemaking Process*

Advocates of the old conception of peace pursue "top-down diplomacy among states" (Kaldor 2019:24). Operational here is the old concept of "peace among

nations” that prevailed until 1989. It is traceable to the development framework of philosophers and politicians during the Enlightenment period. Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” became authoritative for its schemes for a “permanent peace treaty, cosmopolitan rights, extending to rights of hospitality to strangers.” Similar to the novelty of contemporary wars is the idea of rethinking peace to comprehend the new developments in the fight against terrorism. The traditional (old) idea of peace contributed to numerous peace agreements of internationally negotiated treaty through the agencies of the United Nations (UNO), the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU) (Kaldor 2019: 24, ftn. 30). The new idea of peace presupposes an “inside” as against “outside” model, which major feature is “a rights based rule of law” (Kaldor 2019:26).

Repression in such countries like China and Russia largely occurred alongside the idea of peace as noninterference in any states’ crises. Although such countries as Russia and China maintained a repression of certain groups and individuals, both pretended as if the civilian population enjoyed peace. The consequence of such a principle appeared in its oddity in the case of Rwandan genocide. Indeed, it was the case of Rwandan genocide that ended the previous idea of peacemaking, highlighted in the principle of noninterference.

Peace, as Kaldor knows, relates to the desire of people to live beyond the vagaries of life. This is only an aspect of the new idea of peace that entails reversing the social condition contributing to the emergence of insurgencies. The new model emphasizes the “inside” model. The point of the new model consists of the peace in a state spreading and growing outwards. While one may insist that the new conception of peace was only an alteration of the direction, such a change remains significant when one realizes that the “inside” comprehends the social conditions to which terrorists appeal. Specific to Kaldor’s idea of peace is the demand that peacemaking appeals more to politics than top-down diplomacy. She insists that the peace process “would be much inclusive, involving civic political groupings, especially women” (Kaldor 2019:25). More than all that, there still remains a unique fact: peace has to do with the human mind. It specifies also another aspect of peace gradually emerging from secular intellectuals who were able to realize the potential of living beyond the “bare life of mere existence (Kaldor 2019:26). This is the model of peace on which Kaldor currently works. Without peace in the country (“inside”), the “outside” would be null and void. In this model, peace is

the “inside” radiating externally. The difficulty concerns the degree to which a country would permit any intrusion in its affairs. China and Russia would rarely allow such an introduction. The next section evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of Kaldor.

### *Religion*

The religious terrain is widely a spectrum principally divided into the most influential religions – Islam to the North, and Christianity to the South. The political attempt of the Muslim community in Nigeria has produced religious insurgencies, killings, and tension throughout the country. Though sometimes sponsored by the government, the progressive Islamization of the country has become a significant program of the Buhari-led government. The interpretation of the cultural divergence of the 2000 encouraged a fundamentalist ideological interpretation of religion in the Muslim community as “a holy war.” Consequently, it has produced Islamic radicals motivated by the poverty-stricken North to call for Islamic jihad. Christians are killed in Nigeria on a daily basis. This has prompted the United Kingdom (UK) lawmakers to call for investigation reports of ‘genocide’ (“Thousands of Christians Killed in Nigeria: UK Lawmakers Call for Investigation Reports of ‘Genocide.’” The most heinous is that President Buhari generally offers a lee-way to the Pastoralist Nomads of Fulani extraction. President Buhari has never condemned the various atrocities of the Fulani Nomads. Not only does the Buhar-led government provide them with ammunitions (like AK 47) the government offers also some regular soldiers to accompany the Pastoralist Nomads to guarantee safety of the Nomads in the course of the heinous offensives against unarmed civilian population. The offer of protection led a Judge in a court of law to declare that killing the Pastoralist Nomads is punishable with a death penalty. On the contrary, the Pastoral Nomads could go away scot free in spite of the numerous killings, kidnappings, and rapes they perpetrate. Boko Haram insurgency broke out of such a fundamentalist Islamic ferment. has to do with the introduction of the Sharia Law Code and an emergence of a Nigerian Islamic state.

### **Evaluation: Approaches and Social Situation in West Africa**

In this section four, I shall address the conceptual part of Kaldor’s theory, the merit of the two approaches for fighting terrorism and lastly why the individual

governments of the sub-region fail to transform the social conditions in their states?

Some critics of Kaldor's concept of "new" wars presume that Kaldor took it as merely a point of departure to anchor her theory. The concept of war, those critics maintain, has not changed in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This objection becomes the more compelling when Kaldor affirms that the "old" (traditional) and the "new" (contemporary) wars denoted, in certain respects, same content. Kaldor's (2013) concept of new wars privileges the German Carl von Clausewitz's idea of war. Clausewitz's idea considers war as "a contest of will," where it is an "act of violence designed to compel our opponent to fulfill our wills" ((Kaldor 2019:22). The concept reflects the meaning of traditional wars, where politicians jostle to gain an advantage for their states. In this sense, Charles Tilly appropriately argues that "war made the state and the state made wars." States fought one another. For peace to reign, they designed the principles of peacemaking.

Further, Kaldor's perspective on contemporary wars isolates the details, the logistics, social situation for the emergence of terrorism, the actors, the humanitarian crisis, response, and peacemaking processes. Her insight in recognizing the features of contemporary wars has enabled her to elaborate the idea of new wars. These features of her theory remain her significant achievement. Turning a blind eye on them depicts failure to interpret her theory in an appropriate light.

The use of force in counterterrorism need not be completely rejected. Although the military use of force yields results that militarize the terrorists. The two approaches work better when combined together. The use of force has to go on with politics (the non-military approach). The nonmilitary method is proactive, and forestalls the radicalization of the youths. The failure of both approaches lies with the absence of legitimate institutions. Each approach has its own accomplishments. The question why do governments of West African sub-region fail to focus their attention on the social condition in their countries? To mention corruption of the leaders is to make an obvious response. The absence of legitimate institutions rather robs the sub-region the opportunity of changing the poor conditions of the societies in the sub-region.

## **Conclusion**

Kaldor's nonmilitary approach is markedly a search for peace through alteration of the social conditions on which terrorism thrives. Kaldor emphasizes changing the social condition as the ideal for stopping terrorists in their tracts. As illustrated with Nigeria, the social situation of most West African countries portrays irresponsible governance, and corrupt attitudes to the management of the common good. The social situation remains unattended to. The social context portrays the marginalization in government, sectarianism, the pursuit of wealth along ethnic lines, and the intent of the Islamic community to foist Islam on the secular state of Nigeria. With such a situation, rampant in the West African region, terrorists would have a ready reason for gaining sympathizers from among the civilian population in West Africa.

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