

**PERSONHOOD AND THE IMPORTANCE OF NAME AND NAMING IN
AFRICA: AN EXPOSITORY DISCOURSE**

Nkechi, Gloria Onah Ph.D

Department of Religion and Cultural studies,

University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Email: gloria.onah@unn.edu.ng

&

Benjamin, Tyavkase Gudaku

Department of Religion and Cultural studies,

University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Email: benjamimgudaku@rocketmail.com,

Abstract

This paper unpacks the constituents that make up the concept of personhood. It also examines the relationship between the various parts that make up personhood. This is done from Africentric, other than Afrocentric perspective. In order to cover the parameters of this discourse, the paper has argued that no person is considered a person without a name. This underscores the relevance of name and naming. Among many other things, the paper has posited that naming bestows a person with an identity and inserts the person into the social fabric of the society. Therefore, this paper unveils the importance of name to the owner of the name, the caller of the name and the input of name to the community that such a person belongs. What does naming imply to the naming individual(s) and the named? This and other related questions are answered by this paper, using secondary sources. This is in addition to focal group discussions held.

Keywords: person, personhood, identity, name, naming.

Introduction

The word 'name' is common. It occupies every day conversations in such a way that one can easily overlook its deeper meaning and implication. The Encyclopedia Britannica (1926) defines name as a word or a group of words that suggest a certain entity whether it is real or fictitious. Furthermore, Al-Qawasmi and Al-Abed-Al-hap (2015) say that name refers to a word or set of words by which a person or thing is known, addressed, or referred to. Naming is an essential and universal process, which people use to identify what surrounds them as a way of communication around the world. This suggests that everything around us has to

be identified by giving it a suitable name, to enable us to distinguish between these things.

Olatunji *et al.*, (2020) are of the view that name is a phenomenon that is universal, although it is also remarkably particularistic. It is particularistic in the sense that the style and pattern of naming varies across human societies. In Africa, personal names play a significant role in virtually all aspects of human life. Among African people, it is conceived that the name an individual bears can exert enormous influence on their general lifestyle and life prospects. On a societal level, the names of people of a particular region are reflections of series of issues regarding their socio-cultural existence.

Name and naming of person appear to be simple; yet it is a complex process with deep meaning and implication. While name confers identity and points to existential essence of the named individual, the process of naming indicates that the naming person(s) has/have power over the named. Depending on the community, the process of naming can be simple invocation and declaration to complex rites and rituals. Furthermore, in some communities, women are the ones who do the naming; but in some others, it is the special preserve of the men, often the oldest persons in the family. The time for naming varies also from place to place. In some communities, naming is done in the morning, in some others in the afternoon and still to some others in the evening: preferably at sun set.

There is a connection between a name and its bearer, which is created after choosing such a name. Put in another way, names are words used as a signifier and what is referred to as a descriptor. It is usually assumed that name identifies a person with his community. However, a focal group discussion held in Garaku in Nasarawa state and Iyima in Kogi state reveals the contrary. According to the participants, there are names that assume some 'universal' dimension. It was argued during the sessions that in modern day Nigeria, names such as Audu cannot be tied to a particular ethnic group in northern Nigeria. In a related development, names such as Ojo are common among the Ebirra and Yoruba ethnic groups. This, therefore, renders the assumption that names depict the identity of the individual suspect.

Some participants in a focal group discussion in Daudu, an outskirts of Makurdi, the Benue state capital say some names are ethnic specific; thus, stamp ethnic

colouration. Some of the examples advanced included Tyongi, which depicts Tiv ethnicity and Ovyé which signifies Eggon ethnicity. That notwithstanding, there are those who argue that names confer identity that may not necessarily be ethnic. Therefore, the argument that names allocate identity to an individual, for which he is generally known and addressed by society can be dismissed. This was a position canvassed by participants in Zuba axis of Abuja.

Away from the controversy of name and the type of identity it confers, names are given not only to human beings. Animals, locations and other creatures too are given names. However, the concern of this paper is names of persons. This explains why the next section is about person and personhood.

Africentric view of person and personhood: Excavating the component parts and their Relationship

Molefe (2020) detects that the idea of personhood in African philosophy is characterized by ambiguity, and often confusion. Scholars of African thought tend to distinguish between ontological and normative concepts of personhood (Wiredu 1996; Gyekye 1992; Oyowe 2013). The ontological idea of personhood deals with the fact of being human. In analyzing it, we philosophically explicate the descriptive features that constitute human nature

It is crucial to understand that this ontological concept of personhood – in some fundamental sense – is prior and informs all other notions of personhood to be considered in what follows. Metz (2013) in his analysis of the debate between Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye, identifies three distinct concepts of personhood, namely: the ideas of (1) personal identity; (2) moral status; and (3) moral virtue. With inference from African scholars such as Metz, four concepts of personhood can be deduced, namely: personhood as a reference to (1) being human; (2) personal identity; (3) moral status; and (4) moral virtue.

Aghamelu (2009) reveals that personality is a principle of unity and therefore the moral principle of human nature ordained by the consequence of human solidarity towards achieving unity of social realities. It is opposed to individuality and unlike individuality; personality has even a deeper metaphysical root. Jacques (1951) is of the view that the best approach to philosophical discovery of personality is to consider the relationship between personality and love. The reason, according to him, is that love realizes the essence of personality, which is the unity of the person

with other minds. As person is essentially social in character, so also is love. The spirituality of the personhood is defined by love.

The basic truth is that love attracts and relates. It is a principle that brings together reality and binds it. Take for instance, among the Madare ethnic group of north-eastern Burkina-Faso, the human person is made up of two parts: the *son* and the *yo* (Remy, 2001). These plural parts of man must unite and relate for man to be man as man. Furthermore, the *son*, which is the visible mode of existing is formed by three parts: *kon*, (the body), *ni* (the vital breath), and *gia* (the feelings and senses).

This too, figuratively underscores the relation of composites and by extension relationship of all human beings. The *yo* is the invisible mode of existence that remain after death. Gudaku (2018) citing Beller, observes that at the centre of the *son* as well as of the *yo*, is the *si*. *Si* means first of all race, lineage. This is the element that connects an individual with one's ancestral lineage and other metaphysical realities. Sanon (1982) explains further that it is by the immortal *si* in human being that the person, even in death continues to exist with all its personality and remains a member of the community. This *si* is after all about what is most essential in man.

A human being, according to Gudaku (2018), is generally referred to as *or* among the Tiv. However, it needs to be emphasized that *or* can only be reckoned with if it is associated with reputable character. It therefore means that reputable character is what defines *or*. People of upright character in Tiv traditional society are the ones who make up the roll call of honourables. They are usually referred to as *via ka or tso/jim* to underscore the excellence in their moral conduct. The link between *or* and reputable moral conduct among the Tiv is succinctly conceptualized by two opposing phases: *or uma* (a living being) and *or kpen* (a dead person).

No society expects moral standard from a dead person. This is because by virtue of being dead, he/she ceases to interact with others. The social element of human life as far as the physical is concerned is null and void. A person of disreputable conduct among the Tiv is likened to a dead person because he is incapable of producing moral conduct in his/her interaction. Thus, moral ability and even his sociality is denied him/her, as captured by the phrase *ngu e inja ga er or kpen nahan* (which summarily means, he is a dead person). Such an individual is not a person.

It therefore means that personhood among the Tiv is essentially tied to moral probity.

Abba (2021) says that the character of man is of supreme importance in African life and thought. This is essentially because it is the thing that God judges. The Akan call character *suban* and the Yoruba call it *iwa*. Character is the essence of African ethics and upon it depends the life of a person. Thus, the Yoruba say 'gentle character is what enables the rope-life to stay unbroken in one's hand'. In a related development, it is said among the Yoruba 'it is good character that is man's guard'. The Akan emphasis that spirit or *sunsum* is the ego. This accounts for the character (*suban*), disposition and intelligence of a person. It is capable of being transformed through training from the state of being light (I. e. timid) to a state of being heavy I. e. courageous (Quarcoopome, 1987).

In a related development, person as understood by Gyekye (1995) is made up of three distinct entities: the *okra* (the soul), *sunsum* (spirit) and the *nipadua* (body). The *okra* is believed to be given by God (*Onyame*) and also bears the destiny of the human being. And since God is conceived of as good, human destiny which comes from God is good as well (Gyekye 1995). It is the bearer of life, so Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu both assert that the presence of *okra* in a human being guarantees life and its absence in the human being leads to death (Gyekye, 1995); (Wiredu, 1983). The *okra* is believed to be eternal but is capable of reincarnating.

The *sunsum* said to be the basis of one's personality and, like the *okra*, is believed to come from God. The *nipadua* is the material component of the person, and is perishable after death. Gyekye's interpretation of the three components of a person has not been accepted by all Akan philosophers. Prominent among these objectors are Kwasi Wiredu and Safo Kwame.

They reject Gyekye's position that the *okra* and *sunsum* are physical. According to these philosophers, the two entities are rather quasi-physical (Wiredu, 1983); Kwame (2004). By this, they mean that the entities have near physical properties and cannot, therefore, be purely spiritual as claimed by Gyekye. Yet, Gyekye's position is affirmed by Ajei (2012) and Majeed (2013). So far as the concept of a person, as discussed in this section, is concerned, what it is for one to be a person or what it takes to be a person is possessed by all human beings. So far as one is 'born of a human seed' (Menkiti 1984), one is expected to possess them. Majeed (2017) says that in order to be described as a person in this sense, it is just adequate

to be a human being. A person or a human being is referred to as *odasani* or *onipa* in Akan language.

Meanwhile, the relation of different components of man is a symbolic pointer to the fact that man must relate ethically with his fellow human beings as well as cosmic principles and ontological realities in order to be fully human. The harmony of their existence makes man and their disharmony dissolves man. This reflects that that sustenance of human beings can only be guaranteed in harmonious relationship. On the other hand, disharmony extinguishes man and by extension the society.

The essence of metaphysics is to express the component parts that constitute man as man. Above all, metaphysics aims at studying and knowing the rules of relationship between the physical and metaphysical realities. In addition, metaphysics seeks to establish how physical realities relate. Relation is essentially social; for it connotes interplay between, at least, two entities. In this case, the Tiv wisdom literature counsels that *uma ka orjime*, which translates as life is being with others. In other words, existence entails other beings.

The Akan are therefore right on point to have maintained that *umunta ungununta ngabunta*- a person is a person only through other people. This speaks volumes of the necessity to relate. To further put relationship in perspective, the Akan oral corpus informs that *honam mu nni nhanao*, which simply means humanity has no boundaries. *Nhanao*, means edge or boundary. This invites us to realize that there is no racial, tribal creedal boundary in relationships, friendships or humanity.

For Musana (2018), personhood seeks to establish the sanctity of the human person; placing him at the right order and level among other creatures in the universe—as the principal actor who defines what the universe is in its intricate interrelatedness. Yes, we have a lot in common with other creatures, such as the chimpanzee which has been found to be closer to humans than any other creature in the genetic composition. We are social beings, just as other animals and insects are. Musana (2018) further observes that we have emotions, knowledge and intelligence, just as some animals do—a dog may be said to be emotionally connected to its owner. Animals can and do make decisions, but it is humans that have the capacity to exercise higher forms of cognitive thought in rational

manners. Animals may be trained to perform 'human' duties, but will still exhibit what humans would categorize as 'animalistic' behaviours.

But humans may also, we may note, manifest such behaviours, but when this happens, they (humans) may be considered 'less' human with a lot of implications. It may be said of such that 'they have no heart,' or may be reduced to impersonal labels or objects. For such, the only explanation for unexpected, anti-social or deviant behaviour is that they are 'dead.' This means that they have ceased to exist in the land of the living – a death that is not defined in physical-bodily terms, but as the loss of personhood (Musana, 2018).

Therefore, personhood transcends ability to speak, reason, have a language, having self-awareness and even remarkably similar genetic make-up as the case is with the chimpanzee or apes. Humans have knowledge of justice, ability for foresight, introspection and various emotional states. The self-awareness of humans sets them apart from other species in the universe; a self-awareness that communicates interdependence with both the natural and supernatural world, which exalts humanity above all else.

Among African, particularly the Bantu speaking people, the most sublime identity one can ascribe to another is to call him/her a person. While this may be at first sight and a recognition of the physical or biological make-up, with time, one has to work hard to prove that he/she does not lose that identity. It is in this case that we have to note that Personhood is attained through socialization where identity is created. Where there is loss of identity, there is obvious depersonalization through creation of other identities that refer to such individuals by what it is that they have done to lose their Personhood.

Musana (2018) explains that in his exhaustive study of the concept of Personhood entertained by the Bantu peoples of Africa, Alexis Kagame a Rwandan philosopher and linguist, found that the Bantu generally think of a human person as consisting of a body, an animating force (which he describes metaphorically as "shadow"), a principle of intelligence, and finally, the heart, which is not thought of as a pump. Just like it is in English, if one becomes a murderer, a rapist, a thief, etc. such a person may not be referred to by a name which is believed to transmit Personhood. Such a person may be considered as 'heartless' for it is the 'heart' (not

the biological organ) that defines a person. A 'heartless' individual can graduate into 'an animal' in this regard since deviance is intolerable.

The Ashanti would state that whereas humans are endowed with conscious will, in a few occasions when drunk or misdirected by an evil spirit in certain limited situations they will manifest 'impersonal' and 'inhuman' behaviours (Williams, 1983). Essentially, Personhood in the African context does not confer freedom upon individuals since they are 'bound' by societal values as 'chains' and 'privileges' in the normative 'do's' and 'don'ts.' It is these that make people human. Even in death one remains bound by these: if he has been an important person in life, his spirit continues to be revered and fed as he is expected to guide, guard and direct the living. If he dies a shameful death, his spirit has to be 'terminated' or 'killed' so that he does not return to haunt the living (Oruka and Masolo, 1983).

Personhood, to the African, is not something one is born with; it is something one has to work for and something at which one can fail. Furthermore, there are degrees of Personhood, and its lower gradations can shade off into nonexistence in the life of a human individual. Life then, on the African conception, is a struggle for Personhood since it is the given culture that constructs Personhood. African societies are, famously, communalistic. The individual is brought up, from the beginning, with a sense of belonging and solidarity with an extensive circle of kith and kin.

The basis of this solidarity is a system of reciprocity in which each individual has obligations to a large set of other individuals. These are matched by rights owed him or her by the same number of individuals. Living amid the reality of this reciprocity, one soon begins to see him/herself as presupposing the group. This is the mainspring of the normative conception of a person. This binds individuals' fates. Individuals sacrifice their independence for the good (interdependence) of all. They are not called upon to make this great sacrifice, but are socialized to be and act accordingly. The values, norms, beliefs and practices shape the behaviour and identity of the members of the community.

However, Personhood has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Generally, in African thought, a person is considered as a combination of the mind, body and heart. Among these, it is the heart, the seat of the will and emotions which is

considered central in everything. The mind is what enables individuals to engage in activities. This is derived from the brain which is the power of reasoning. The body is the material aspect which is visible. It is possible to say, among some Africans, that one is 'dead' even though he/she may be alive in material terms.

The concept of the other, person and personhood are somewhat interrelated. For instance, Musana (2018) observes that there are situations where members of a particular ethnic group view themselves in an exclusive manner when dealing with other ethnic groups. Due to limited knowledge and interactions between communities, an ethnic group may claim dominance, or even deny the existence of others. To such groups, killings and murders of others may be a way of 'cleansing' or 'purification.' In such cases, there are constructs that are used to define the 'other' as 'impersonal, which justifies the inhuman treatment that would be melted to the individual.

Meanwhile, name is what defines the individual in his multidimensional relationships. Therefore, the proceeding section examines the sociology and dynamics of name and naming. It also explains the implication of naming on the owner, giver of the name and the community.

Name and naming in African Worldview

Name is an important aspect of human life. It is an insignia that communicates about one's identity and relationships with both the physical and spiritual worlds. As a matter of fact, name is a communicator and signifier. It signifies who a person is to himself and to others. This is why Johann Wolfgang von Goethe cited in Udechukwu and Nnyigide (2016) says that a man's name is not like a mantle, which merely hangs on him and which one perchance safely twitch and pull, but a perfectly, fitting garment, which like the skin has grown over him, at which one cannot rake and scrape without injuring the man himself.

Put another way, Awolalu and Dopamu (1979, p.6) are of the view that "names are not just abstract terms couched in indefiniteness; they are not mere labels. But they are pregnant with meaningful and symbolic importations". Thus, naming forms part of "the anthropological rite of passage in birth in a family, as well as the incorporation of the new born into a clan or religious or national community" (Ganapathy-Doré 2013, p. 15).

According to Mbarach and Igwenyi (2018), naming is a cultural construct of identifying a person through the employment of the cultural strategies in the given society and its realization through language. Naming is one of the practices that emphasize the mutual relationship that exist between language and culture, wherein culture embodies language, while language expresses culture. It is for this reasons that Guma (2001) observes that names mean more than words used for identification purposes.

In order to point out other functions of naming, Mbarach and Igwenyi (2018) opine that often times name reflect the circumstances of a child's birth, the parent's perception of the child, their ideology of parenting, the expectation of both the parents and the extended family members on the role the child is to play in the family, the community, as well as the society. Thus, names are used in every culture and are of great importance to the giver, the named one and the society.

Balogun and Fasanu (2019) say that among the Yoruba, the type of name(s) that is/are given to a new-born child is often determined by the circumstance(s) into which that child is born. These may include the situation/condition of the parents, events surrounding the birth, historical/cultural reality of the time, the *òrìs*, a being worshipped by the parents and/or the lineage to which the child's name is prefixed with its totem, family occupation, the cognomen (*oríki*), etc., while these names can generally be classified into three main groups for ease of reference: *àmútòrunwá*, which deals with the nature of birth; *àbíso*, which is the christening or social name; and *oríki*, which encompasses cognomen/attributive name(s).

Dehnart (2009) posits that names communicate much more than a label, but equally depict who the individual is, both to his family and to others, as well as establish the individual's reputation which is recalled whenever the name is thought of or mentioned. The import of Dehnart's (2009) view is that while the name identifies the person to whom it is given, the continuous use of the name communicates the whole personality of the individual as well as the identity of his environment or society. Through names, we can identify where a person comes from, hence, they (names) reflect both the linguistic and the cultural identity of the bearer.

For instance, Agyekum's (2006) study considers the Akan names of Ghana as sociocultural tags that have meanings and perform sociocultural functions. He attributes religious names (Christian and Islamic) as the outcome of imported religions in Ghana which add to the existing typologies of names and increase the adoption of multiple names that often give prestige to the bearer's social standing when acquired through virtuous means but debases the bearer when acquired through vicious means. Among the Yoruba, naming follows a pattern that is peculiar to such 'anthropological rites', including those whose origins are found in myth and rituals.

The Sociology and Dynamics of Name and Naming.

The aim of this section is to among other things, use sociological perspective of symbolic interactionist perspective to explain the important link between societal existing cultural practices and patterns of naming in African society. Suffice it to say that social interaction among people is only possible through construction of symbols (Geertz, 1966; La Fontaine, 1980). These symbols according to this perspective play very important roles in making social relationship possible.

Another basic assumption is that self-concept develops through one's awareness of the perspectives of others over one's behaviour (looking glass self) and of how one's feelings about oneself (pride or shame, for example) reflect one's sensitivity to the positive or negative reactions of others (Cooley 1902; Kenny & Albright, 1987). Some of the proponents of the symbolic interactionist theory include Ervin Goffman, George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, and Herbert Blumer.

In the words of Blumer (1969), society is in constant process of being created through social interactions, interpretations and definitions of actors in situations, and thus, society influences the individual's self through its shared norms, values and beliefs. According to Stryker (1980), the self-concept is an embodiment of cognitive and affective components; the cognitive component includes the given collection of identities; while the affective component is self-esteem, however, self-concept emerges out of the reflected cultural definitions of members of a society (Gecas & Burke, 1995).

Using this theory to analyze the symbolic importance of names among African people, it could be said that names generally constitute symbols through which people identify themselves. Captured in another way by Olatunji *et al.*, (2015) a name symbolizes a lot about a person; it is a symbol from which someone's personality, gender and many socio-cultural characteristics as religion, social class, geographical location, and spiritual status is reflected. For example, among the Yoruba of Nigeria, *Ikumolu* (death has taken the successor) is a name believed to be exclusive for males and that a female could only bear it if all the males of a family are deceased.

Technically, naming in an African context is considered to represent symbols of relationships, events, spatial units, and beliefs, ethical and social values (Ota, 2002). Names also carry some aspects of telepathy among African people (Agyekum, 2006). According to Zawawi (1996) cited in Agyekum (2006: 208) "a name constructs a person because the name one bears may create an attitude in those who hear it before they meet the name bearer".

It is important to emphasize that technically, a name is a noun; a noun is a name of any person, place, animal or thing. The above definition gives the general philosophy behind a name, and the social significance of assigning a name in human society (Olatunji *et al.*, 2015). As could be reflected from the definition, there is virtually no known phenomenon without specific name(s); it is only the unknown phenomena that their names are not known to humans. This is a reflection that names are social constructions and are reflections of human social experiences; this assertion could be buttressed by the fact that names given to the same phenomenon differs across societies. For instance, the name given to the same specific object in the English language differs from the name given to it in Tiv, Bajju, Igala or Kwalle.

Meanwhile, Olatunji *et al.*, (2015) observe that name serves as the socio-cultural expression and elucidation of self-concept. From the interactionist perspective, names are not just abstract terms couched in indefiniteness, they are more than mere labels, but loaded with meaningful and symbolic connotations. Another important fact about name is that, it is only human beings that have the gift of

naming individuals with specific names. In other words, the naming pattern used by human beings is unique only to the human species.

In African societies, Agyekum (2006) says that the culture of name and naming (i.e., the cumulative deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired in the course of generations) is an important component of the cultural system in that it is conceived among the African people that a good name should be given to a child because the name assigned will determine a lot about the present and future of the child.

Although naming is a universal culture, the processes involve patterns of naming and types of names common in all societies vary across cultures. For example, in most Western societies, names to be given to an infant are predictable because few socio-cultural factors influence naming dynamics in those societies. This might have influenced the conclusion that 'there is nothing in a name'. Similarly, among Indians, a name has some socio-cultural relevance to people's socio-cultural characteristics as class, caste, religion and deities which could be observed from a person's name. Also in Africa, people's name can be a source of information regarding a person (Yusuf, *et al.*, (2014).

Although, all known and unknown phenomena have actual or potential names respectively; Olatunji *et al.*, (2015) insist that a human name possesses more social significance than the name of mere objects. Human name is an important issue that lots of factors influence it and it (name) also influences lots about human social reality. For African people, a name is part and parcel of person's being (Liseli, 2012). Mwaniki (2013) argued that names are not only given as a means of identification, but also imposes ethical standards and social values in an indirect way.

For instance, the Yoruba believed that given names have profound and powerful effects, and that the name a child bears can influence his/her entire life cycle from sundry behaviour, integrity, professions, success and so on. According to Ryan

(1981:146), 'the name given to human infant distinguishes him or her socially and incorporates him or her fully into the wider society'.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined the concept of person and personhood, identifying also the component parts. The paper also insists that every person has a name. For every name, its meaning consists on one level of the deictic function of 'identifying' the individual. But when asked about the meaning of their names, most people are able to unravel long, complex, deeply felt narratives about their personal history, the people they are a part of, the aspirations of their parents and their own aspirations. According to Joseph (2004: 176) on this level, which is particularly important in certain cultures, though absent in none, the meaning of one's name is tantamount to the meaning of one's life.

Names can be considered (semantic/verbal) labels which both identify and distinguish an individual from other individuals. Like, for example, totemism, they are used to differentiate and forge relationships among individuals and groups (Lévi-Strauss, 1966). Allport (1937, as cited in Joubert, 1993) described a person's name as the most important anchor point of identity; Walton (1937, as cited in Joubert, 1993) even considers it a determining factor in personality development. As a matter of fact, a personal name can give instant information about social background, culture, language and even religion, as well as identifying the bearer as a particular individual.

Works cited.

Abba, W. K. (2021). *Inclusion, Fairness and Good Governance: The Pragmatic Philosophy*

of Yakowa (Unpublished Work).

Aghamelu, C. F. (2009). "The Human and Social Order: A Moral Perspective", *Nnamdi Azikiwe*

Journal of Philosophy, 2(1): 37-46.

Agyekum, K. (2006). The sociolinguistic of Akan personal names. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*. 15(2): 206-235.

Ajei, M. O. (2012). Problems with Wiredu's Empiricism. *Legon Journal of the Humanities*, 23:

185- 204.

Al-Qawasmi, A. H. and Al-Abed-Ak-Haq, F. (2015). A Sociolinguistic Study of Choosing Names for

Newborn Children in Jordan. *International Journal of English Linguistics*, 6(1): 177-186.

Awolalu, J.O. and Dopamu, P.A. (1979). *West African traditional religion*. Ibadan: Onobonjo Press and Book Industries.

Balogun, L. and Fasanu, S. (2019). Complexity and Politics of Naming in Yoruba Tradition:

A Dramatic Exploration of Once Upon an Elephant. *Geneology*, 3(18): 1-18.

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic Interactionism Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall*

Cooley, C. H. (1902) *Human nature and social order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons

Dehnart, J. (2009). Name stories and name research: A name's meaning. Retrieved from

<http://www.meaning.name/RE/>, 09/02/2023.

Encyclopedia Britannica. (1926). London: The Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.

Ganapathy-Doré, G. (2013). Playing Hide and Seek with Names and Selves in Salman Rushdie's

Joseph Anton: A Memoir. *ATLANTIS Journal of the Spanish Association of Anglo-American Studies* 35: 11-25.

Gecas, V. and Burke, P. J. (1995). "Self and identity" In K. Cook, G. A. Fine, and J. S. House

(Eds.), *Sociological perspectives on social psychology*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Geertz, F. (1966). *Person, time and conduct in Bali: An essay in cultural analysis*. Program

cultural report series, 14 Yale: South-East Asian Studies.

Gudaku, B. T. (2018). Moral Philosophy and Nation Building- An Afri Barometer. Unpublished

work.

Guma, M. (2001). The cultural meaning of names among Basotho of Southern Africa: A

historical and linguistic analysis. *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 10(3): 265-279.

Gyekye, K. (1992). 'Person and Community in Akan Thought'. In: Wiredu, K., Gyekye K. (eds).

AKU: AN AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

ISSN: 26814-0761 (Print) 2814-0753 (e). Vol. 4 No. 4. 2023

A Publication of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies

- Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, I.* Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- _____ (1995). *An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme* (revised Edn.). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Jacques M. (1951). *Man and state*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Joseph, J. E. (2004). *Language and Identity: National, ethnic, religious*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- La Fontaine, J. (1977). "The power of rights" *Man* 12: 421-437.
- Joubert, C. E. (1993): Personal names as a psychological variable. *Psychological Reports*, 73: 1123-1145.
- Liseli, A.F. (2012). African names and naming practices: the impact slavery and European domination had on the African psyche, identity and protest. A Master of Art Thesis submitted to Graduate School of the Ohio State University.
- Kwame, S. (2004). Quasi-Materialism: A Contemporary African Philosophy of Mind. In: Kwasi Wiredu (ed.), *A Companion to African Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Majeed, H. M. (2017). The Nexus between Person, Personhood and Community in Kwame Gyekye's Philosophy. *UJAH*, 18(3): 26-45.
- Mbarachi, C. S. and Igwenyi, E. (2018). Language, Identity and the Cultural Context of Names in Selected Nigerian Novels. *International Journal of Language and Literature*, 6(1): 29-37.
- Menkiti, I. A. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In: Wright, R.A. (ed.). *African Philosophy: An Introduction* (3rd Edn.). Lanham, Md: University Press of Americas.
- Molefe, M. (2020). *African personhood and applied ethics*. Makhanda: African Humanities Program.
- Musana, P. (2018). The African Concept of personhood and its relevance to respect for human life and dignity in Africa and the global context. *African Study Monographs*, supplementary issue, 56:21-32.

- Mwaniki, I.N. (2013). "Oral narratives: social cultural repository of names and naming practices of Agikuyu in Kenya". *International Journal of Education and Research*, 1(8):1-12.
- Quarcoopome, T. N. O. (1987). *West African Traditional Religion*. Ibadan: African University Press.
- Olatunji, A., Issah, M., Noah, F., Mohammed, A. Y., and Suleiman, A. (2015). Personal Name as a Reality of Everyday Life: Naming Dynamics in Select African Societies. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 8(3): 71-90.
- Ota, O. (2002). "Edo personal names and world view" In I.P. Ohioma & O.E. Francis (eds.), *New perspectives in Edoid studies: Essays in honour of Ronald Peter Schaefer*. Centre for advanced studies of African society. Book Series No.
- Oruka, O.H. and Masolo, D.A. (eds.) (1983). *Philosophy and Cultures*. Nairobi: Bookwise.
- Udechukwu, G. I. and Nniyigide (2016). The Religious and Socio-Cultural Implication of African Names: Igbo Naming System as a Paradigm. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, (IJAH). 5(3): 89-103.
- Remy, B. (2001). *Life, Person and community in Africa*. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa.
- Sanon, G. (1982). *L'Ecole et mon village: De l'éducation Traditionnelle Madare al education scolaire en haute Volta*. These de Doctorat, universite des sciences Humanies de Stransburg
- Stryker, S. (1980). *Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version*. Menlo Park: Benjamin Cummings.
- Williams, T.R. (1983). *Socialization*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Wiredu, K. (1983). The Akan Concept of Mind. *Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies* 3:113-134.