

**RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: GEOPOLITICAL
DYNAMICS AND THE SEARCH FOR GLOBAL RELEVANCE**

Ebere R. Adigbuo, PhD

Dept of History and International Studies
Delta State University, Abraka Nigeria
pecilljob@gmail.com

Abstract

The Soviet Union as a super power was committed to the promotion of communism throughout the world. Today, Russia as a continuation of the Soviet Union is not a communist country but is striving to win back its global status, backed up with adequate military capabilities. In the post Cold War era, Russia resolved never to follow the leadership of the West, particularly the United States, but in the stead would position itself as a leading sovereign power in the international community, that cherishes multilateralism as the pathway to world peace. Convinced that the break-up of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia is determined to achieve the global super-power status. To ascertain whether the Russia Federation has achieved its self-assigned foreign policy objective the qualitative research method is used in this study. This method helped to examine and analyze the extant literature on international politics, particularly the ones that affect the subject of study. The paper argues that Russia's foreign policy like that of many other nations is not based on altruism; the Russia's foreign policy post 1991 had been set to achieve a rationally packaged national interests meant to secure the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia. The achievement of these interests meant that Russia must never sheepishly follow the dictates of its geographically placed Western neighbours, in what some analysts have dubbed a uni-polar international system, propagated by the United States.

Keywords: Russia, Post Cold War, International Politics, Uni-polar system, Major power status

Introduction

To state that the end of the Cold War marked the end of an epoch in the evolution of the international political system would amount to stating the obvious. The bipolar world order which characterized the Cold War era had crumbled with the collapse of the divisive Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. These events ushered in a new world order with a missing superpower. The stage was all set for the United States to enjoy its new-found position as

the world's only superpower in the international political system. Howbeit, from the ashes of the defunct Soviet Union, the Russian federation sprouted, inheriting what was left of its predecessor: a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, a robust military arsenal, Soviet Union's assets as well as treaty obligations, and of course a poor economy.

The young Russian State was therefore faced, from inception, with the onerous tasks of stabilizing its domestic environment and finding its place in the emergent international system. In fact, in the immediate post-Cold War years, Russia no longer saw itself in any sort of ideological or superpower rivalry with the West. This is evident in the 1992 declaration made by Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, who asserted that the country would be committed to democratic principles and peaceful cooperation with all states. By 1993, Russia's foreign policy objective was expanded from simply being focused on peaceful cooperation to a desire towards "ensuring Russia an active role as a great power"ⁱThis declaration therefore marked the beginning of Russia's concerted efforts aimed at re-asserting itself as a major player not only in its geographic sphere of political influence but also in the international arena. It is therefore the goal of this essay to identify some key events that help to explain Russia's quest for global relevance in the post-Cold War era. In this search for global relevance, geopolitical considerations are relevant. Geopolitics is here taken to mean how the erstwhile Soviet geographic zone influences the political phenomena and interests of the Russian Federation.

The essay is essentially divided into six sections. The first is this introduction. It is followed by an examination of the Russian foreign policy objectives in the post Cold War era. Since the democratizing Russia plays a great premium in the international political system, the quest for a multilateral world is examined in section three. The fourth section deals with geopolitical imperatives and Russia's use of force

in some selected conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria and Venezuela. Russia's quest to disrupt the notion of a post-Cold War uni-polar order is particularly glaring at the United Nations. This issue is also examined in section four. The fifth section examines the geopolitical challenges to Russia's quest for global relevance. Notable among such challenges include the country's mono-cultural economy, hostility with the West which has resulted in a number of sanctions especially from the European Union and the United States, as well. The last section is the conclusion.

Russia's Foreign Policy Objectives

Russia today is not the totalitarian communist Soviet Union that continued as a super power before its collapse in 1991. It is rather a democratizing state. Analysts like Michael Mcfaul had argued that Russia has no single articulated foreign policy goal like Soviet Union. While the foreign policy of Soviet Union was to expand world socialism by destroying western capitalism and democracy, that is not the case with Russia. Today, Russia's foreign policy as a democratizing state is fashioned from a domestic politics that is purely pluralistic.ⁱⁱ Be that as may, the following quintessential Russia's foreign policy objectives are herein outlined:

- a. Russia is set in realistic terms to pursue its "national interests" ⁱⁱⁱ by "protecting [its] sovereignty, security and territorial integrity". Russia's national interests, involves the protection of the rights of its citizens abroad. Russia understands that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians have become the most divided people in the world, since over 20 million Russians now live outside Russia ^{iv} and in particular in the Commonwealth of Independent states.
- b. To reposition Russia as a major international player;
- c. To reverse Russia's internal decline by having a buoyant economy;
- d. To achieve the three above, Russia must strive to pursue economic, military and political cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Issues about CIS-the countries that broke out of the defunct Soviet Union-have lots of geopolitical importance to Russia since they ordinarily fall into her sphere of influence. Russia strives to achieve these crucial foreign policy objectives diplomatically by its belief in multilateralism and making use of military force as outlined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Russia's Quest for Multilateralism

The concept of multilateralism implies that nations should cooperatively be involved in global affairs. Liberal theorists that focus on democratization, integration, international law and international organization see conflicts as resulting from deep “rooted global deficiencies”.^v Fukuyama argues that:

The world is far too diverse and complex to be overseen properly by a single global body. A truly liberal principle would argue not for a single overarching, enforceable liberal order but rather for a diversity of institutions and institutional forms to provide governance across a range of security, economic, environmental and other issues.^{vi}

The end of the Cold War supposedly bequeathed on the world a uni-polar order in which the United States towered above all other countries in terms of economic and military capability. Russia frowns at such an international order. Russia has a firm belief in the principle of multilateralism with its membership in global and regional organizations. Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Regionally, Russia is the largest European country in terms of population and territory. Besides establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the Cold War, Russia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental military alliance that comprises of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The six states were part of CIS and the military alliance came into force on 15 May 1992. Russia is also a member of The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); EAEU is an economic union comprising of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. These states are located in Eastern Europe and central/northern Asia. The Treaty establishing this economic union was signed on 29 May 2014 and became operational on 1 January 2015. Besides these organizations, Russia is member of BRIC, an acronym for the union of four states: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Russia and China are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Russia has on several occasions expressed its displeasure with the post-Cold War notion of unipolarity; it rather prefers a multi-polar world order in which no single country takes pre-eminence over other states.^{vii} First, the Russian government had seized every opportunity during its immediate post-Cold War era to assert its great power status.

As far back as the Yeltsin era when Russia was still pursuing a pro-West foreign policy, the country did not hesitate to describe itself as a great power which deserved partnership with the United States on the basis of equality; this was regardless of whether or not other states considered it as one.^{viii}

By 1996, Russia's quest for multi-polarity was expanded when it began to seek partnership with China. This was in response to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into areas that Russia has geopolitical interests. Russia's foreign policy calculation is that a Sino-Russian partnership would deter the United States from abusing its powers as a result of its superiority in terms of economic and military capability. Although the Sino-Russian partnership at the time did not achieve much in deterring the United States and its NATO allies, the point to stress is that Russia's preference for a multi-polar world order prompted its partnership with China. This is particularly evident in the statement made by the Russian analyst, Stanislav Kondrashov:

We [Russia] should not lie and let it [The United States] walk over us, even for the sake of fighting international terrorism. It would be more natural for us to make overtures to Europe and form a bloc with it when America's pretensions to world hegemony become too absolute. We must not forget China and India either.^{ix}

Also, Russia's quest for multi-polarity was evident in the way Russian authorities in the late 1990s deliberately denounced US dominance in their public declarations, rather promoting the idea of a multipolar world order. For instance, in 1996, Primakov, Russia's foreign minister at the time described Russia's role as a counterweight in the "transition from a bipolar world to a multi-polar one."^x By 2001, Russia's partnership with China had taken a new turn when both countries formally signed the Sino-Russian Treaty on Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation. The primary objective of the treaty was to promote a new world order as opposed to a unipolar world order that supposedly emerged at the end of the Cold War.^{xi} The Treaty noted specifically that the new world order which it sought to achieve would be a multi-polar world where justice and fairness would prevail.^{xii} This Treaty came in the heels of the US-led NATO intervention during the Kosovo War in 1999.

Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had essentially altered the nature of international politics on at least two fronts. First, it ushered in an era when transnational terrorist networks entered into the global scene as relevant actors in international relations. Next, the terrorist attacks provided the United States with the *causus belli* to carry out unilateral attacks against perceived state sponsors of transnational terrorism as well as terrorist safe havens, thereby consolidating its dominance in world politics. It was at this point therefore that Russia changed its strategy for ensuring a multi-polar world. With China already established as an emerging power, based on its fast growing economy as well as military and technological advances, Russia seized the opportunity offered by the 9/11 attacks to re-assert itself as a significant power. Rather than confronting the United States at this point, it identified with the country, with Russia's President Putin being the first world leader to extend a condolence message to US President Bush.^{xiii}

In the aftermath of the attacks, Russia offered to assist the United States in rooting out the terrorists through intelligence sharing, increase in direct humanitarian and military assistance to the Northern Alliance and the US-favoured Rabbani government in Afghanistan, opening of Russian airspace to American flights, cooperation with Russia's Central Asian allies to provide airspace access to American flights, as well as participation in relevant search and rescue exercises.^{xiv} Russia's offer of assistance to the United States in the immediate post 9/11 period did not simply mark some sort of cooperation between both countries, but helped Putin register in the mind of American leaders that Russia has continued to be major player in global affairs. This earned Russia some degree of goodwill from the Bush administration in its campaign against Chechen rebels.^{xv} Suffice to recall that President Bush was under criticism for not mounting pressure.

Other methods through which post-Cold War Russia has attempted to promote its multilateral agenda is by offering support to other countries that are opposed to America's hegemony. A relevant example in this regard is Venezuela which is geographically located close to the United States. In Venezuela, Russia is seeking to develop a power centre by investing huge sums on its military, and ensuring that the country's dictatorial government remains in power, despite widespread anti-government protests. As at 2008, Russia announced its intention to build a nuclear power reactor in Venezuela.^{xvi} This is in addition to its robust contribution in terms of foreign aid, military equipment as well

as soft loans to the Latin American country.^{xvii} Since 2006, Russia is noted to have sold over \$11 billion worth of military hardware to the Chavez and Maduro regimes in Venezuela, some of which include several Tu-160 Backfire Bombers which are capable of deploying nuclear weapons.^{xviii}

Similarly, Russia has contributed significantly to Iran's nuclear programme.^{xix} Even in the face of Iran's current diplomatic row with the United States, Russia has expressed its willingness to assist Iran in acquiring Uranium, though this was justified to be primarily for civilian use.^{xx} In North Korea, Russian has equally contributed significantly towards propping the regime. For instance, in 2012, Russia wrote off ninety percent of North Korea's \$11 billion debt, further promising to use the remaining \$1 billion when repaid, to invest on energy and humanitarian projects in North Korea.^{xxi} These examples are not isolated cases of Russia's attempts to help prop other countries in order to achieve its grand objective of a multi-polar world. However, beyond trying to establish several power centres necessary for a multi-polar world order, Russia has also been involved in a foreign policy of using military force by confronting the West and its surrogates; the overall aim is Russia's quest for global relevance in the post-Cold War era as shown shortly.

Geopolitical Imperatives and Russia's Use of Force

It has been observed that Russia's national interests, involves the protection of the rights of its citizens including those living erstwhile Soviet territories. Russia's protection of its citizens abroad can be seen in its use of force in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia voluntarily joined Russia at the beginning of the 19th century and thus was saved from being occupied by Othman Empire. Soviet Union's dictator, Josef Stalin, hails from Georgia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are recognized by Russia as independent states after the Russia-Georgian war in August 2008. Russia's use of force has some geopolitical antecedents. Ukraine decision to join NATO, defied Putin's warning—that Ukraine must forfeit Crimea and the eastern regions. America ignored Russia's red line and went further to make Ukraine a Western wall on Russia's border, following the NATO summit at Bucharest in 2008. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Since February 24, 2022 Russia efforts is to annex the entire Eastern region of Ukraine. The foregoing is an indication that the causes and course of the conflict in eastern Ukraine were beyond the simple explanations and justification offered in

popular media. First, Mearsheimer^{xxiii} notes that Russia's annexation of Crimea was in response to the expansion of NATO. According to him, Putin's response with the annexation of Crimea should have come as no surprise for the West, since the enlargement of NATO to include Ukraine would have put Russia in a precarious security situation.^{xxiii}

Mearsheimer's views on the cause of Russia's annexation of Crimea is shared by other scholars such as Mankoff^{xxiv} who stresses that the annexation of Crimea was motivated by Russia's desire to escalate Russia's confrontation with the West as consequence for NATO's expansion. He argues that Crimea would have presented NATO with the opportunity of establishing a NATO naval base to checkmate Russia. McFaul^{xxv} however argues that although Russia's annexation of Crimea was borne out of Russia's unflinching desire to confront the West, the expansion of NATO does not offer sufficient explanation for the incidence. The point to stress therefore is that whereas different schools of thought may interpret the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine military conflict from different perspectives, there appears to be an agreement that the annexation was confrontational, regardless of whether such confrontation is a response to the expansion of NATO or not. The West has given series of sanctions against Russia for annexing Crimea and for the current invasion of Ukraine. Russia has borne the sanctions with equanimity while at the same time she capitalizes on the western divisions. As Russia steadily moves with China, there are fears in the western world. Macron has warned his colleagues in the EU of strategic mistakes should dialogue with Russia is not initiated. Macron is convinced that Russia would help solve world problems like North Korea and Syria. Addressing the Council of Europe, the organ that suspended and placed sanctions on Russia, after annexing Crimea, Macron affirmed that culturally, geographically and historically Russia is fundamentally European, and should be treated as such. His campaigns for Russia has further entrenched the divisions in the EU, particularly among European states that are suspicious of Russia.

The conflict in Syria offers another useful example of Russia's politics of confrontation with the West in the post-Cold War era. Elsewhere,^{xxvi} it has been argued that the civil war in Syria has been roundly hijacked by Russia and the West as an avenue to continue the kind of rivalry that was typical of the Cold War period. Russia has remained an ardent supporter of the Syrian regime, effectively blocking all proposed UNSC sanctions against the regime, while propping it with military, technical

and financial aid. The West, on the other hand, is relentless in its determination to bring about regime change in Syria. Its determination has led to the offer of assistance to various anti-regime forces, all of which have resulted in the prolonged war in Syria.

Russian contribution to the Syrian conflict may best be described as the provision of diplomatic shield for the Syrian regime, much to the chagrin of the United States and its Western allies. However, aside the sale of military hardware to the forces loyal to the regime of Basha al-Assad, Russia's economic interest in the conflict are unclear, while its military interest is not sufficiently convincing. For instance, analysts have considered Russia's naval facility at the Port of Tartus in Syria as a possible explanation for its involvement in the Syrian conflict. It is needful to note that the Russian naval facility in Syria was established since 1971 during the Soviet era to provide the Russian navy with a place to refuel warships within the Mediterranean without having to withdraw to the Black Sea. In the post-Soviet era, this port has been of less importance to the Russian navy, and has been seldom used since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, saving the Assad regime in Syria because of the rarely used naval facility would not be economically or even strategically wise for the Russian federation.

The difficulty in finding economic or even military interests that would have motivated Russia towards propping the Assad regime in Syria, may lead one to think of other strategic factors that may have motivated Russia's foreign policy with regards to the civil war in Syria. One credible explanation in this regard is Russia's confrontation with the United States and its Western allies. Syria is Russia's last foothold in the Middle East, and as such is strategically important to Russia's quest to maintain great power status. On the other hand, Syria's geographical proximity with Israel makes it a territory of interest for the West, especially considering that it poses an existential threat to the State of Israel. Russia's determination to prop the Assad regime may therefore be understood in the light of its efforts to remain relevant in the Middle East, especially in the light of the activities of the United States and its allies.

As noted in the previous section, Russia's aspiration as a major power in the international political system with a capability to influence issues worldwide can be seen in the solid support given to the embattled President Nicola Maduro of Venezuela by President Vladimir Putin and the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result Kremlin stranglehold in the

Venezuela's economy has deepened^{xxvii} and Moscow is today sowing further instability in the USA own sphere of influence.

Also, Russia's politics of confrontation with the West has been very remarkable in its voting pattern at the United Nations' Security Council where it is one of the five permanent members of the Council. Article 27 of the United Nations Charter endows permanent members of the UNSC with the right to discard any draft resolution of the Council with a single vote. This has, over the years, been regarded as the veto power of the P5 members of the UN Security Council. During the Cold War years, Soviet Union and the United States exhibited little or no restraint in using their veto rights to block whatever resolution was perceived to have favoured each other. The overall implication of this situation was that the United Nations was unable to deal with some of the security challenges that faced the world during the Cold War years.

The end of the Cold War witnessed a significant decline in the frequency of vetoes at the UNSC. It is pertinent to note that for the first time in the history of the UN, there was no single exercise of veto right for three years (between May 1990 and May 1993). However, what is more interesting is that during the period, post-Soviet Russia was essentially pursuing a pro-West foreign policy, and as such had not begun its search for global relevance. This explains why its first veto came in 1993 after Kozyrev had announced Russia's desire to be reckoned as a great power in international politics. Ever since, as is reminiscent of the Cold War years, Russia has exercised its veto rights more than every other country since the end of the Cold War. Suffice to note that between May 1993 and June 2018, the veto right has been exercised for forty times, of which the Russian Federation has vetoed more than half the number, with a total of 22 vetoes.^{xxviii} It is also imperative to note that all of China's UNSC vetoes since 2001 have been in unison with the Russian Federation.^{xxix} Russia's renewed exercise of its veto right is not only reminiscent of the Cold War era, but is also a testimony of its quest to be considered as a major player in the international politics of the post-Cold War era.

Geopolitical Challenges

The concept of space and geopolitics as applied to the Russian Federation has remained central in its foreign policy. The essence is to guarantee Russia's survival within its identified borders. But some existential threats as conceived by Russia had been fraught with lots of geopolitical challenges, both from the domestic and international

environments. Amidst these geopolitical challenges is Russia's dependence on oil and natural resources. While Russia is currently one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil, but the excessive dependence on the hydro-carbon resource has left the economy at the mercy of global oil prices.^{xxx}For instance, the fall in global oil prices between 2014 and 2016 dealt a severe blow on the Russian economy. The Russian roubles plummeted.^{xxxi} Inflation and unemployment rates soared,^{xxxii} thus reducing the worth of the Russian economy.

Moreover, the West's hostile relation with Russia has also posed challenges to the latter's quest for global relevance. This is especially in view of the negative consequences arising from sanctions slammed against Russia by the United States and its European allies. With the annexation of Crimea and the current invasion of Ukraine, the United States alongside the European Union imposed a wide range of sanctions against Russia, some of which included Russia's exclusion from the G8 summit, suspension of negotiations with regards to Russia joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Energy Agency and the removal of Russia from the Swift monetary system. These sanctions have strained Russia's relations with the United States and European Union. In some cases, visa bans were placed on many Russian personalities and the Russian assets frozen.^{xxxiii} These sanctions has

These sanctions have made some analysts to depict the Russian Federation as moving from a great power to a pariah state. An isolated power with myriads of sanctions and low credit ratings, would find it difficult to realize its full potentials in the comity of nations. Russia realizes this evil omen and has simultaneously place sanctions on the West. As the Ukraine finds it difficult to export its wheat, there has arisen a global food crisis. The West that has about 40% of its oil and gas from Russia has problems filling the gap. The sanctions on Russia are turning to an evil wind that has done no good, and those contesting whether Russia is a great power are having a rethink.

Conclusion

This essay has discussed Russia's search for relevance in world politics since the end of the Cold War in 1991. The essay argues that whereas Russia began its post-Soviet era with a pro-West foreign policy agenda, it soon began to demand for a more remarkable role in global politics as it began to seek recognition as a great power. This it has pursued through a foreign policy of confrontation with the West as well as its

quest for a multilateral world order in rejection of US hegemony. This study however acknowledges that regardless of the Russia's determination to find a place in the hall of fame of international affairs, there are certain factors that pose as challenges to the actualization of its great power agenda. Some of the geopolitical challenges have been identified to include the multiple sanctions emanating from Russia's confrontation with the West, as well as its economy which is heavily dependent on oil and gas.

Endnotes

ⁱAlla Kassianova, "Russia: still open to the West? Evolution of the state identity in the foreign policy and security discourse." *Europe-Asia Studies* 53.6 (2001): 821-839.

² Michael McFaul 1999, "What Are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives"? *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Washington, DC

ⁱⁱⁱ Andrey Urnov, 2010 "Russia in Unipolar and Multipolar World", in *Nigeria-Russia Relations in a Multipolar World* edited by Eze O.C & O Agbu, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 31-46.

^{iv} *Ibid.*

^v Kegley Jr, *Charles W. World Politics: trend and Transformation 11th Edition*, USA: Thomson Learning Inc, 2007, pp 574-575.

^{vi} Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007, p.163.

^{vii} VY Portyakov. Vision of Multipolarity in Russia and China and International Challenges. *Comparative Politics* 4.1 (2013): 86-97.

^{viii} A. Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership." *Foreign Affairs* 73.3 (1994): 59-71.

^{ix} Martin A. Smith. Russia and multipolarity since the end of the Cold War. *East European Politics*, 29.1 (2013), 36-51.

^x Thomas Ambrosio, *Challenging America's Global Preeminence: Russia's Quest for Multipolarity*(Chippenham: Antony Rose Ltd, 2005), p.86.

^{xi} Susan Turner, "Russia, China and a Multipolar Order: The Danger in the Undefined." *Asian Perspective* 33.1 (2009), 159-184.

^{xii} *Ibid.*

^{xiii} John O'Loughlin, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov, "A 'Risky Westward Turn'? Putin's 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 3-34.

^{xiv} Kari Roberts, "Empire Envy: Russia-US Relations Post 9/11." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 6.4 (2004), 1-23.

^{xv} *Ibid.*

- ^{xvi} NimaGerami, and Sharon Squassoni. *Venezuela: a nuclear profile*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.
- ^{xvii} Sabah Naas Shanafah and Mohamed Aziz Abdel Hassan. "Russian Effort to Return the Global Role and Adjust the International Balance in the 21st Century." *Journal of US-China Public Administration* 15.2 (2018): 85-92.
- ^{xviii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xix} Mark Fitzpatrick, "Assessing Iran's nuclear programme." *Survival* 48.3 (2006): 5-26
- ^{xx} Lionel Beehner, "Russia's Nuclear Deal with Iran." Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/background/russias-nuclear-deal-iran> Accessed July 21, 2018.
- ^{xxi} Samuel Ramani, "Can Russia Help Solve the North Korea Crisis?" *Monde chinois* 1 (2018): 91-93.
- ^{xxii} John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin." *Foreign Aff.* 93 (2014): 77.
- ^{xxiii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxiv} Jeffrey Mankoff, "Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine." *Foreign Affairs.* 93 (2014): 60-68.
- ^{xxv} Michael McFaul, "Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?" *Foreign Affairs* 93.6 (2014): 167-178.
- ^{xxvi} Ebere Richard Adigbo, "Cold war resurgence: The case of Syrian uprising." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 19.8 (2014): 39-47.
- ^{xxvii} John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak, "Russia's Intervention in Venezuela: What's at Stake?" September 12 (2019). <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/> Accessed 13 January 2020.
- ^{xxviii} United Nations, "Security Council Veto List." Dag Hammarskjold Library, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick> Accessed July 21, 2018.
- ^{xxix} Richard Roth, "Russia, US spar on Iran, North Korea, Syria." CNN, January 18, 2018. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/18/us/un-security-council-russia-united-states-spar/index.html> Accessed July 21, 2018.
- ^{xxx} Yelena Tuzova and Faryal Quayum, "Global Oil Glut and Sanctions: The Impact on Putin's Russia." *Energy Policy*, 90 (2016): 140-151.
- ^{xxxi} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxxii} Rebecca M. Nelson, *US Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015).
- ^{xxxiii} Rafal Matera, "G8-Suspension or Fall? From Cold War to Cold War. A Short History of Russian Participation in Major Industrial Democracies." *Elzietahoroszewicz, EdytaSweklej, Roman Niedziolka, Krzysztof*(2017): 171-193.